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Abstract 
In this thesis, I present and defend an interpretation of Kant’s theory of inner sense. This 
theory is central to the Critique of Pure Reason, but it has proven difficult to grasp. I suggest 
that inner sense provides us with a point of view, and that this point of view is constituted by 
the degree of clarity and distinctness of our representations.  
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1. Introduction 
James Van Cleve, in his book Problems from Kant, devotes a chapter to Kant’s theory of 
time. He concludes the chapter with a small section under the heading: “What did Kant really 
believe about time?”1 His conclusion is that this is an open question, to which conflicting 
answers can, and seemingly must, be given.  
In Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Henry Allison’s book on the Critique of Pure Reason,2 
he approvingly quotes Paton as saying: “Kant’s doctrine of self-knowledge is the most 
obscure and difficult part of his philosophy.”3 
What do these laments have in common? The fact that they are both directed toward the 
topic of this thesis: Kant’s theory of inner sense. Inner sense links time to self-knowledge, as 
the following passage shows: “Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the 
intuition of our self and our inner state” (A33/B49). Our difficulties in understanding Kant’s 
views on time and self-knowledge can therefore be considered as symptoms of a more 
general problem: the lack of a coherent understanding of Kant’s theory of inner sense.  
The aim of my thesis is to develop an interpretation this theory. Of course, the result will not 
amount to a complete explication of inner sense and its role in the critical philosophy, which 
is a task of a different scale. Rather, the more limited ambition is to present a framework 
within which such an explication would be possible, and in the course of this presentation to 
elucidate some central themes of the Critique. The thesis is structured along the following 
trajectory: 
                                              
1
 James Van Cleve, Problems from Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 60. 
2
 Citations from the Critique of Pure Reason, hereafter Critique, will be referenced directly after the quotes. The references 
follow the established convention; by giving the page numbers from the A edition of 1781, and the B edition from 1787. I 
use the Guyer & Wood translation from the Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant. (Immanuel Kant, Critique 
of Pure Reason, transl. Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Particular sections 
of the Critique will be mentioned with capital letters, without quotation marks, e.g., the Refutation of Idealism, the B 
Deduction. 
3
 H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative (London: Hutchinson, 1958), 233; quoted in Henry Allison, Kant’s 
Transcendental Idealism – Revised and Enlarged Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 276. 
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Chapter 2 serves as an introduction to the main subject: The first part will exhibit what Kant 
has to say about inner sense. More specifically, it presents the different facts about inner 
sense that an interpretation must take into account. These different facts can be roughly 
separated into two groups. One group focuses on inner sense as opposed to outer sense, and 
the relevant facts are the asymmetries that Kant finds between these two senses. The other 
group focuses on inner sense as opposed to apperception, and the relevant facts concern the 
special role that inner sense has in providing us with knowledge of ourselves.  
The next section will then analyze two existing interpretations: one given by Henry Allison, 
in Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, and a more recent interpretation by Markos Valaris, in 
his article “Inner Sense, Self-Affection & Temporal Consciousness.”4 Allison’s 
interpretation is premised upon distinguishing between two separate aspects of inner sense. 
However, I will conclude that this separation is untenable, and that a unified interpretation of 
inner sense must be sought. Valaris attempts to give such a unified account; inner sense 
provides us with an awareness of our “point of view,” a kind of mobile “vantage point” in 
space and time, from which we experience the world. My analysis will show that there are 
problems involved in making this proposal fit with what Kant says about space and time, and 
that it does not seem as if Kant claims that inner sense provides a vantage point located in 
space and time. But the important – and I believe correct – idea, which I will therefore adopt 
in my own interpretation, is to see inner sense as providing us with a point of view. 
In the third part of this chapter I will argue that Kant in fact gives us a clue as to how we 
should understand this idea. In his critique of Leibniz, Kant suggests that Leibniz 
conceptualized the inner state of the monad through an analogy with our inner sense. And the 
inner state of the monad is a point of view, constituted by the distribution of clarity and 
distinctness of its representations. Thus my hypothesis is: The point of view provided by 
inner sense is the state of our representations, as clear or obscure, distinct or indistinct.  
Chapter 3 will begin to develop this hypothesis. The first part is devoted to an explication of 
the notions of clarity and distinctness: What does it mean for a representation to be clear and 
distinct? Above all, this involves showing that Kant has a theory of clarity and distinctness in 
                                              
4
 Markos Valaris, ”Inner Sense, Self-Affection & Temporal Consciousness” (in Philosopher’s Imprint vol. 8, nr. 4 2008). 
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the first place. An important result of this investigation is to see that both clarity and 
distinctness come in degrees, and that they both concern the ability to differentiate a 
representation from others. Another result is a preliminary exploration of the complex 
relation between aesthetic clarity and logical clarity, i.e., the clarity of intuitions and the 
clarity of concepts. The distinction between intuitions and concepts is fundamental to Kant’s 
philosophy. However, the theory of clarity and distinctness, as it is developed in this section, 
concerns representations in general, whether concepts or intuitions, and will therefore serve 
as an entry point into the interrelation that must exist between them.  
In the second part of the chapter I will proceed on the basis of the results of the previous 
section. The question is: In what sense is a degree of clarity, and especially logical clarity, 
sensible? This is obviously crucial insofar as we are looking for a theory of inner sense. The 
answer to this question is that the degree of clarity is a sensation, and corresponding to this 
sensation is what Kant calls the intensive magnitude of consciousness. This leads us to the 
realisation that as intensive magnitudes, the sensation of clarity and the degree of 
consciousness corresponding to it fall under Kant’s categories of quality.  
Chapter 4 is an investigation of Kant’s concept of self-affection. Self-affection is closely 
related to inner sense: the manifold of inner sense can be determined only by affecting 
ourselves. In the first part of this chapter I explicate the concept of an “act of attention.” This 
act is the only explicit example of self-affection that Kant gives. I argue that it should be 
understood as a logical act that modifies the degree of clarity of our representation, by 
bringing a particular representation to clarity, thereby facilitating the act of judgment that is 
essential to Kant’s philosophy. But since the clarity of a representation is always a degree, 
judgments can never be completely safeguarded against error.    
In the second part, I proceed to the concept of transcendental motion. In the Critique, Kant 
distinguishes between two different kinds of motion. Transcendental motion is “motion, as 
action of the subject (not as determination of an object)” (B155). I argue that this 
transcendental concept of motion should be understood as the sensible determination of inner 
sense, i.e., as bringing discriminations, and thereby degrees of clarity, into the indeterminate 
sensible given. This act is carried out under a sensible condition: the form of inner sense, 
time. The change of the degree of clarity is thereby continuous, in accordance with the 
intuition of time.  
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Chapter 5 has the overall task of explaining how inner sense, as explicated in my 
interpretation, relates to experience, both inner and outer. In the first part of the chapter I 
discuss the principle of intensive magnitude, which claims that all such magnitudes are 
continuous. As we have seen, the degrees of clarity are intensive magnitudes. I believe that 
this can help us with the problem of justifying the principle, a problem that has not been 
satisfactorily resolved in the secondary literature so far. What I will attempt to show is that 
the degree of consciousness, corresponding to the degree of clarity, is implicated in Kant’s 
proof for the principle of intensive magnitude. It is therefore a step towards showing the 
validity of the principle that we can, as the final part of this section demonstrates, show that 
the degree of clarity is a continuous magnitude. 
In the next part, I proceed to look at sensations in general. It turns out that sensations in 
general – warmth, color, etc. – cannot without further ado be separated from their degree of 
clarity. This raises the question of how it is possible to determine an intensive magnitude 
separate from our degree of clarity. The answer to this question is that such a separation can 
only be effected through determining what corresponds to the sensation as a causal power. In 
the case of intensive magnitudes, this allows us to correlate changes in intensive magnitudes 
with changes in extensive magnitudes, as for instance changes in heat are measured by 
changes in the height of the column of mercury of a thermometer. The main point is that 
since intensive magnitudes can be objectively determined only by means of correlating them 
with extensive magnitudes, and extensive magnitudes are continuous, any objective intensive 
magnitude must thereby be continuous as well. If the degrees of clarity cover the subjective 
intensive magnitudes, then the preceding analysis have shown that both objective and 
subjective intensive magnitudes must be continuous; e.g., the principle of intensive 
magnitudes will have been justified.  
In the final part, I sketch an analysis of the problem of inner experience. In the Refutation of 
Idealism, Kant aims to show that inner experience presupposes outer experience. I believe 
that our preceding investigation can help us understand why this is so: intensive magnitudes 
can be determined only by being correlated with extensive magnitudes, as causal powers. 
And this can only happen in space, according to Kant. If our subjective intensive magnitudes 
can be determined only on the basis of this objective determination, then inner experience 
necessarily requires outer experience.  
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As to the methodological aspect of the enquiry, the thesis is chiefly an attempt to work out 
what Kant meant. The close reading of Kant that follows is an attempt to tease out some of 
the specificities of Kant’s system: inner sense as opposed to outer sense; the categories of 
quality as opposed to the other category groups. This is based on the conviction that there is 
much of interest and importance to be learnt from carrying out such a project.  
Kant’s critical philosophy, perhaps best known under the term “transcendental idealism,” 
was also considered by Kant himself as a “formal idealism” (B519n.). In Kant’s Theory of 
Form5, Robert Pippin analyses Kant’s formalism, uncovering a slew of problems in the 
process, and concludes by saying that “many of those problems are consequences of Kant’s 
formal methodology itself, his attempt to specify a priori, formally, independently of any 
material or metaphysical commitments, the subjective structure of our experience of the 
world.”6 And he is of course not the only one to raise similar qualms about Kant’s theory; as 
Pippin points out, the movement of German idealism immediately following Kant himself 
can plausibly be viewed as a reaction against what was perceived as the rigid and excessive 
formalism of Kant’s version of idealism. However, I believe that the adjectives “rigid” and 
“excessive” can be pitted against each other: It is my contention that the architectonic 
extravagance of Kant’s system is precisely what allows for its suppleness, and that this 
apparent excess is therefore needed in order to support its claim to adequacy. The capacity of 
Kant’s philosophy can only be grasped through familiarity with the nooks and crannies of its 
formal architectonic structure.  
                                              
5
 Robert Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 
6
 Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form, 228. 
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2. From Inner Sense to the Monad 
2.1 Inner Sense – an Introduction 
The aim of this section is to introduce Kant’s theory of inner sense. We will begin with a 
simple picture: a parallelism between inner sense and time, on the one hand, and outer sense 
and space, on the other. Had this picture been the entire story, a short and straightforward 
introduction would have sufficed. However, outer sense and inner sense are far from being 
completely symmetrical. In short, after presenting the simple, parallelistic picture, the 
remainder of the section will be devoted to giving a clear and comprehensive overview of the 
asymmetries between space and time as well as outer sense and inner sense. Here, I will not 
be concerned with answering the questions that come up (that is the task of the rest of the 
thesis), but simply with raising them. The aim is to present the full extent of the challenges 
that any interpretation of Kant’s theory of inner sense must face. This will be the backdrop 
for constructing an interpretation in the rest of the thesis, and also enable us to analyze two 
existing interpretations in the next section.  
The basic distinction we start from, then, is that between inner and outer sense. In the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, inner sense is introduced by the following characteristic: “Inner 
sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state” (A22/B37). Outer sense, 
on the other hand, is said to present us with objects outside of us. A further characteristic of 
inner sense is its temporality: “Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the 
intuition of our self and our inner state” (A33/B49). The form of outer sense, on the other 
hand, is space. Based upon this characterization, we can construct the following, “naïve” 
picture: everything that we take in through our outer senses (where “senses” are here taken to 
mean our familiar sensory modalities: sight, hearing, etc.) we experience as being in space. 
However, in addition to these senses, we are also immediately aware of ourselves; our mind, 
our thoughts and feelings, and so on. Thus, we say that we are aware of these things through 
“inner sense,” and further, it seems that we do not experience our mental states as being in 
space, but only in time.  
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So far, we have said nothing that is blatantly wrong with respect to how Kant sees inner and 
outer sense. We might, however, try to fill out our intuitive picture by an account of how 
they relate to one another. The obvious thing to say would be that there is some kind of 
mutual influence between inner and outer sense. What we see and hear influences what we 
think, and what we are thinking and feeling influences what we see and hear (directly 
through our focus, indirectly through our actions). But this mutual influence does not extend 
to a complete determination; what we think is not completely determined by our outer 
sensory input, and what we see and hear is not completely determined by our thoughts and 
feelings. In other words, inner and outer sense can be seen as two partially independent, but 
mutually influencing streams of sensory input.  
This final gloss, however, is not faithful to Kant’s thought. For what he says demands not 
only several distinct levels but also different relations of complete dependence between the 
two senses (inner and outer) on the different levels. And it is this complicated web of 
relations that we must proceed to map. 
2.1.1 Inner and Outer Asymmetries 
There are three main levels where the asymmetry between outer and inner sense comes to the 
fore:  
1) First of all, Kant consistently maintains that any sensible faculty is receptive to a manifold. 
The manifold of sensibility is the material which is given through the senses, i.e., through 
inner and outer sense. And it is at this level that we encounter the first asymmetry between 
inner and outer sense. In a passage Kant added to the B edition of the Transcendental 
Aesthetic (B66ff.), he tries to clarify his doctrine that we only cognize appearances, not 
things in themselves, by pointing to the fact that everything we experience in outer sense 
consists of mere relations; of place, motion, etc. He continues:  
It is exactly the same in the case of inner sense. It is not merely that the representations of outer sense 
make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind, but also the time in which we place these 
representations, (…) already contains relations of succession, of simultaneity, and of that which is 
simultaneous with succession (that which persists) (B67, italics mine).  
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In other words, the material of inner sense is the representations of outer sense, i.e., inner 
sense does not have its own manifold. Accordingly, the material for thinking is indeed 
completely determined by the material given through seeing, hearing, etc., according to Kant.  
2) Intuitively, there is one flaw in the simple picture we outlined above. Namely, whereas it 
seems plausible to say of mental states that they are in time but not in space, it is clearly false 
to say of the objects outside us that they are in space but not in time. And indeed, Kant goes 
on to say:  
All representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as 
determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner state, (...) so time is an a priori condition of 
all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and 
thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances (A34/B50-51).7 
While this already points to an asymmetry, since everything is in time but only outer 
representations are in space, this is not the crucial asymmetry implied by the above quote. 
Rather, the main point of interest is the distinction between the immediacy of inner intuitions 
being in time, as contrasted with the mediacy of outer appearances being in time. One must 
therefore account for a difference in the way inner and outer representations are in time. 
More specifically, Kant says that time is the immediate condition of inner intuition and 
“thereby” the mediate condition of outer appearances. This clearly suggests that outer 
appearances are in time because inner intuitions are, however that is to be understood.  
3) Thirdly, there is also an asymmetry between outer and inner experience. In the Refutation 
of Idealism (B274-279), Kant is concerned with refuting what he terms “problematic 
idealism” (B274), i.e., the Cartesian kind, which claims that our knowledge of ourselves is 
more certain than any knowledge of outer objects. Kant’s argument against this position will 
proceed by showing that “even our inner experience, undoubted by Descartes, is possible 
only under the presupposition of outer experience” (B275). In other words, Kant reverses the 
asymmetry between outer and inner experience found in Descartes, and claims that any inner 
                                              
7
 In the quote, Kant refers to the inner intuition “of our souls.” But as we shall see, Kant is also clear that we do not have an 
intuition of “the soul itself, as an object” (A22/B37). There is a persistent ambiguity in Kant’s use of the concept of “soul,” 
owing, I believe, to a distinction between an invalid concept of soul – the soul as an object, i.e., as a substance – and a 
valid, “critical” concept of soul – the soul as an intensive magnitude. I explain this in chapter 3.2.  
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experience already presupposes outer experience. The possibility of inner experience is 
therefore completely dependent upon prior outer experience.  
Thus, instead of the two partially independent, mutually influencing streams envisaged 
above, we have several relations of dependency that operate between inner and outer sense, 
on different levels.8  
Now, I want to emphasize that at this point, there is not much we can say about exactly how 
these relations of dependency should be understood, and equally, it is unclear how they relate 
to each other. What we can perhaps perceive is a determinate direction (where we begin with 
“manifold,” go on to “time,” and end up with “experience”): since, for intuitions to be 
temporal, we presuppose a manifold; and for experience to be possible, our intuitions must 
be temporally determined. In any case, the asymmetries sketched here must be considered 
alongside the special features related to the informational content of inner sense, i.e., the 
connection between inner sense and the self.9 
2.1.2 Inner Sense and the Self 
As we have already seen, inner sense is the sensibility through which the mind “intuits itself, 
or its inner state” (A22/B37), and Kant even speaks of the “inner intuition (of our souls)” 
(A34/B50). But from the very beginning, Kant is quick to point out that this provides “no 
intuition of the soul itself, as an object” (A22/B37). This is another striking difference from 
outer sense, where the fact that you intuit outer objects seems to be accompanied by the fact 
                                              
8
 Many recent commentators have been concerned with showing that Kant was in no sense a “phenomenalist.” (e.g., 
Graham Bird, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge (New York: Routledge, 1965); Robert Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), ch. 7; Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism , 38-42; Hoke Robinson, “The 
Priority of Inner Sense,” in Kant Studien 79, nr. 2 1998, 165-182) This debate involves some issues (like those related to 
the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction) that lie outside the scope of my thesis. The part of the debate that is pertinent to 
my concerns – like empirical knowledge, the Refutation of Idealism, etc. – is mostly brought up in sections 5.2-5.3.  Note, 
however, that these sections presuppose the preceding chapters, in a way that obviates many of the lesser nuanced ways of 
posing the “phenomenalist or non-phenomenalist?” question with regard to Kant. For instance, we can already note that 
instead of attempting to determine the priority of either inner sense or outer sense (as e.g. Robinson, “The Priority of Inner 
Sense,” in which he actually argues for the priority of outer sense), we have delineated three different levels of dependency, 
where outer sense has “priority” on the first of them, inner sense on the second, and outer sense on the third.   
9
 All the asymmetries noted here might perhaps be conceived in terms of mediacy vs. immediacy. With time, this is clear 
from what we have already said above. But Kant also notes that the Refutation of Idealism proves “that outer experience is 
really immediate” and that “inner experience itself is consequently only mediate and possible only through outer 
experience” (B277). Whether the outer manifold can be said to be immediate, whereas the inner manifold is only mediate, 
Kant does not say, but it seems a plausible way of phrasing the issue. In any case, this does not bring us much further as 
long as the meaning of the terms “mediate” and “immediate” is unclear.  
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that your outer intuitions are intuitions of outer, empirical objects. It is not exactly clear what 
it is that you do intuit in inner sense, and this lack of clarity is exacerbated when Kant says 
that the mind intuits “itself, or its inner state” (A22/B37, emphasis mine). For not much later, 
the disjunction becomes a conjunction, and he speaks of “the intuition of our self and our 
inner state” (A33/B49, emphasis mine). Unfortunately, Kant does not specify what he means 
by either “our self,” “our inner state,” or “inner intuition (of our souls),” except that it is not 
the soul itself, as an object. We might surmise that this problem is related to the fact that 
inner sense has no manifold of its own. Because of this, any intuition of our self or our inner 
state must be based solely on the material given in outer sense, i.e., the outer representations. 
The question is: how is this material able to become or provide intuitions of our self or our 
inner state rather than of outer objects? It appears that Kant attempts to answer this question 
by providing us with a theory of what must happen in order for inner intuitions to take place, 
namely, a theory of self-affection.  
Kant’s first reference to self-affection is in the B edition of the Transcendental Aesthetic: 
Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition and, if it 
contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which, since it does not represent anything 
except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind 
is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representation, thus the way it is affected 
through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form (B67-68).  
This account of self-affection, suggestive as it is, does not really bring us any closer to an 
understanding of what is going on in inner sense. Especially when Kant goes on to conclude 
from this that the subject only intuits itself as it appears to itself, and suggests that “any 
difficulty in this depends merely on the question of how a subject can internally intuit itself; 
yet this difficulty is common to every theory” (B68). The reader might beg to differ here; the 
difficulty does indeed seem specific to Kant, since the natural suggestion is that the subject 
intuits inner impressions of itself, but this would imply a specifically inner manifold, 
something Kant denies. In any case, there is only one other place in the Critique where Kant 
explicitly discusses self-affection: in the final sections of the B Deduction. 
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The structure and function of the Transcendental Deduction as such is too large a topic to 
enter into here.10 Our focus is inner sense, and the fact that in the B Deduction Kant relates 
inner sense to the “transcendental synthesis of the imagination.” But to explain this, we must 
first give a short account of what this transcendental synthesis of the imagination is, and 
what role it plays in the Deduction.  
Imagination as such is, according to Kant, “the faculty for representing an object even 
without its presence in intuition” (B151). Thus, the initial impression is that imagination is 
a faculty for imagining things other than those we actually perceive. In the Anthropology 
from a Pragmatic Point of View (hereafter Anthropology), Kant gives a fuller definition, by 
bringing in a distinction between two essentially different functions of the understanding: 
The power of imagination (facultas imaginandi), as a faculty of intuition without the presence of the 
object, is either productive, that is, a faculty of the original presentation of the object (exhibitio 
originaria), which thus precedes experience; or reproductive, a faculty of the derivative presentation of 
the object (exhibitio derivativa), which brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that it had 
previously.11 
However, in the Anthropology it is not quite clear what Kant intends to show with this 
distinction. In the examples he later goes on to adduce, productive imagination is said to 
depend upon the senses, as much as reproductive imagination does, thus, “to a person who is 
born blind we cannot make any colors comprehensible.”12 The distinction between 
productive and reproductive might therefore seem to consist only in the distinction between 
imagining things as one actually perceived them in the past, and imagining new 
combinations based on what one has previously perceived. However, this does not make 
sense of the fact that Kant claims that productive imagination “precedes experience,” a claim 
he repeats in the Critique. There Kant distinguishes productive from reproductive 
imagination in the following manner: “I also occasionally call it the productive imagination, 
and thereby distinguish it from the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject 
solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and that thereby contributes nothing to 
                                              
10
 Specific themes from the B Deduction will be analyzed later in the thesis, more precisely the signification of the terms 
”attention” (in chapter 4.1) and ”motion, as action of the subject” (in chapter 4.2).  
11
 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Ak 7:167; Anthropology, History, and Education, 278. 
12
 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Ak 7:168; Anthropology, History, and Education, 278. 
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the explanation of the possibility of cognition a priori, and on that account belongs not in 
transcendental philosophy but in psychology” (B152). Essentially, what is going on is that 
the productive imagination is given a crucial role in the Deduction, whose aim is to show 
that the categories are valid a priori of all objects of experience. This transcendental role of 
the imagination, Kant writes,  
can thus determine the form of sense a priori in accordance with the unity of apperception, the 
imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori, and its synthesis of 
intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the 
same time the ground of all others) to objects of intuition that is possible for us (B152).  
This is a difficult passage. What we can draw from it, at least, is that the transcendental 
synthesis of the imagination determines the sensibility (including inner sense), thereby 
providing us with possible objects of experience. In the following section, Kant returns to the 
problematic of inner sense, which he claims must have appeared as a “paradox” in the 
Aesthetic: that we intuit ourselves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, 
which means that “we would have to relate to ourselves passively” (B153). As we saw 
earlier, our problem was a different one; namely, how we could intuit ourselves at all. But if 
Kant’s explanation shows how it is that we intuit ourselves only as we appear, then that 
answers our question as well. His answer depends upon distinguishing inner sense from 
apperception. In the Anthropology, he gives the following account of their difference: “Inner 
sense is not pure apperception, a consciousness of what the human being does, since this 
belongs to the faculty of thinking. Rather, it is a consciousness of what he undergoes, in so 
far as he is affected by the play of his own thoughts.”13 The transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination has a different relation to inner sense than to apperception: it presupposes and 
accords with the unity of apperception; it is a presupposition of and determines inner sense. 
For it is this synthesis which “is capable of itself determining sensibility internally with 
regard to the manifold that may be given to it in accordance with the form of its intuition” 
(B153). In other words, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination – that is a condition 
for the possibility of experience in general – is also responsible for self-affection.  
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 Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Ak 7:161; Anthropology, History, and Education, 272. 
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As already mentioned, this is not the place to interpret these passages; that is a task for the 
entire remainder of the thesis. Below, I have formulated a list of “criteria,” i.e., statements 
Kant makes about inner sense, which can serve to guide us in our interpretation. Any 
plausible interpretation of inner sense should be able to account for most of these criteria.  
1) Inner sense does not have its own manifold (B67). 
2) Inner sense is determined by self-affection (B67-68, B153-154). 
3) Inner sense, as distinguished from apperception, is a passive/receptive faculty, and its 
form of intuition is time (A33/B49, B153).  
4) Time is the immediate condition of inner intuition, the mediate condition of outer 
appearances (A34/B50-51).  
5) The intuitions of inner sense must tell us something about ourselves as we appear, about 
our “inner state” (A22/B37, A33/B49) 
6) Inner experience presupposes outer experience  
 
Finally, we should also remark that if inner sense is intimately connected with the central 
issues of the Transcendental Deduction – as our quick introduction to the transcendental 
synthesis of the imagination above seemed to indicate – then a theory of inner sense will also 
be of importance for understanding Kant’s Critique at large.14  
Beginning with chapter 2.3, I will put forward an interpretation that I believe allows us to 
make sense of all the features of the Kantian doctrine of inner sense as I have presented it 
here. But before that, I will situate my view by presenting two competing interpretations: that 
of Henry Allison, in the revised edition of his book Kant’s Transcendental Idealism; and a 
recent interpretation by Markos Valaris, in his article “Inner Sense, Self-Affection and 
Temporal Consciousness.”  
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noteworthy, therefore, that such a schema is described as: “A transcendental product of the imagination, which concerns the 
determination of the inner sense in general” (A142/B181).  
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2.2 Other Interpretations 
2.2.1 Allison –  A “Two-Aspect” Theory of Inner Sense 
In my analysis of Allison, I will focus my attention on one particular feature of his rich 
discussion. This specific feature is chosen for two reasons: First of all, I believe that it is 
central to the understanding of Allison’s interpretation of inner sense. Second, and perhaps 
more important for the purpose of this thesis, it highlights what I believe is the most striking 
contrast between Allison’s account and my own, and thereby serves to draw attention to 
issues that will become relevant later.  
Allison is keenly aware of the many asymmetries and difficulties concerning inner sense that 
I have already pointed out in the introduction. The overall strategy he adopts in his 
interpretation is, as I see it, to split the theory of inner sense in two; by distinguishing 
between two distinct aspects of inner sense. On the one hand, inner sense serves as 
“providing a merely subjective order of the succession of representations in empirical 
consciousness.”15 Viewed from this point of view, inner sense is integral to the possibility of 
experience in general, because its form, time, is the “a priori formal condition of all 
appearances in general” (A34/B50). On the other hand, it also has another, more specific 
function, namely: “as a sensory form of self-awareness, through which the mind intuits itself 
and its states. Inner sense, so construed, is contrasted not with outer sense but with 
apperception.”16 In other words, in its first aspect inner sense and its form serves as a 
condition of all appearances in general, whereas in its second aspect, inner sense and its form 
serves as a condition for intuiting oneself and one’s inner states.  
As noted, inner sense is determined by self-affection. Allison suggests that, in parallel with 
the distinction between the two aspects of inner sense, we also need “a distinction between 
two senses of “self-affection”: one connected with the transcendental synthesis [of 
imagination] and serving as a condition of all experience, the other connected with the 
empirical synthesis of apprehension and serving as a condition of a specifically inner 
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experience.”17 Whereas Allison never specifies how what I have called the two “aspects” of 
inner sense are related, he is more explicit concerning self-affection: They are two distinct 
kinds of self-affection, one transcendental and the other empirical.  
To summarize, one can therefore say that Allison draws a distinction between the aspect that 
is relevant to experience in general, from the aspect that is relevant to specifically inner 
experience. I will not go into details concerning how Allison, on this basis, goes on to 
account for the criteria I listed above. For I do not believe that Kant distinguishes between 
two aspects of inner sense and, correspondingly, two kinds of self-affection. I have three 
reasons for this: First of all, I believe that it is possible to give a plausible unified 
interpretation of inner sense and self-affection. Secondly, I hope to have actually done so in 
this thesis. Third, I believe that it is necessary to give such a unified interpretation, because 
of textual evidence that speak, in my opinion decisively, against Allison’s dual account. I 
will point to some of these passages now, not as a refutation but at least to indicate that an 
alternative interpretation might be desirable, and to indicate what this alternative 
interpretation will aim to show.    
The problem with distinguishing two aspects of inner sense and two kinds of self-affection 
is, as far as I can see, the lack of any indication on Kant’s part that he is in fact operating 
with Allison’s two distinct senses of each of these crucial concepts. To the contrary, he often 
seems to say things that go against such a differentiation. I will provide some examples of 
passages where there is at least a prima facie resistance against a dual account of inner sense 
and self-affection: 
1) Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner 
state (A33/B49).  
On Allison’s account, Kant is here referring to the second aspect of inner sense, as a “sensory 
form of self-awareness.” As we have seen, inner sense also provides the succession of 
representations in empirical consciousness in general. In the quoted passage, however, Kant 
writes as if he is talking about inner sense in general, that is, there is no hint that he is 
referring only to a specific, restricted part of inner sense (i.e., the second aspect). It would 
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therefore be desirable if one could show that the “intuition of our self and our inner state” is 
the succession of representations in empirical consciousness in general. 
2) Apperception and its synthetic unity is so far from being the same as the inner sense that the 
former, rather, as the source of all combination, applies, prior to all sensible intuition of objects in 
general, to the manifold of intuitions in general, under the name of the categories; inner sense, on 
the contrary, contains the mere form of intuition, but without any combination of the manifold in 
it, and thus it does not yet contain any determinate intuition at all, which is possible only through 
the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the 
imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on inner sense), which I have named the 
figurative synthesis (B154).  
Here, Kant contrasts inner sense with apperception. But the contrast seems to be based on the 
first kind of self-affection (the one connected with the transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination), rather than the second, specifically inner, kind of self-affection that should be 
the relevant one according to Allison. It would therefore be desirable if one could show how 
the self-affection connected with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination serves to 
distinguish inner sense from apperception. 
3) In inner sense (...) the empirical consciousness can be raised up from 0 to any greater degree, so 
that the very same extensive magnitude of intuition (e.g., an illuminated surface) can excite as 
great a sensation as an aggregate of many other (less illuminated) surfaces taken together 
(A176/B217).  
Since sensations are “subjective representations” (B207), we might expect them to be related 
to the intuition of “our self and our inner state” (A33/B49). Indeed, Kant says that: “Things 
like colors, taste, etc., are correctly considered not as qualities of things but as mere 
alterations of our subject” (A29/B45). If this is correct, it should indicate that Kant is talking 
about the “self-awareness” aspect of inner sense. But on the other hand, the principle that he 
is attempting to prove is supposed to be valid a priori of perception in general. If so, then 
showing its validity only for the self-awareness aspect of inner sense is insufficient. It would 
therefore be desirable if one could show how the a priori validity of the principle can be 
established through an argument based upon sensations in empirical consciousness.   
Before proceeding to my own interpretation, I will analyze a different attempt to construct a 
unified account of inner sense; that of Markos Valaris, in his article “Inner Sense, Self-
Affection and Temporal Consciousness.”  
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2.2.2 Valaris – Perspectival Awareness 
Valaris takes Allison’s account as his starting point, but argues that “there is only one kind of 
self-affection,”18 i.e., he refuses Allison’s distinction between two aspects of inner sense and 
two kinds of self-affection. His challenge, then, is to explain how this is compatible with the 
seemingly dual role of inner sense: in experience in general, but also in specifically inner 
experience.  
This involves revaluating the contribution of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. 
On Valaris’ account, this same act of synthesis is responsible for determining both inner and 
outer sense. And both these determinations are needed in order for experience to be possible. 
The key idea in Valaris’ article is to emphasize the indispensability of perspective for our 
experience. Anything we can conceivably experience must be perceived from a certain point 
of view, a perspective on the world. According to Valaris, the transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination provides us with this perspectival outlook, and it does so by simultaneously 
determining inner and outer sense: 
on the one hand, it synthesizes the manifold in a perspectival outer intuition whose content we can – at 
least, for the sake of the argument – express in the form ‘this F’, and on the other, it makes this content 
available to inner sense as a glimpse of the world from one’s current point of view.19  
In other words, outer sense provides the perspective, whereas inner sense gives an awareness 
of the perspective. Since we must be aware of the perspective we occupy in order to have 
experience, this explains the role of inner sense in experience in general. At the same time, 
we can thereby become aware of this specific inner “point of view” itself, which is required 
for inner experience.  
While I find this to be an ingenious proposal for a unified account of inner sense, I do not 
think it solves all difficulties. First of all, I am not sure it can account convincingly for the 
connection between inner sense and time, on the one hand, and outer sense and space, on the 
other. For as Valaris admits, the “perspectival outer intuition” is both spatial and temporal, 
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and the perspectival awareness provided by inner sense is also both spatial and temporal. 
Though Valaris does present arguments that aim to connect inner sense to time and outer 
sense to space, he also admits that “the states of outer objects should have no reason to be 
any less immediately temporal than the states of the subject.”20 On the face of it, this 
contradicts criterion 4 listed above.  
Moreover, Valaris claims that though inner sense provides us with a point of view, with 
“intuitions of itself as a spatiotemporally located subject of outer perceptions,”21 this does 
not mean that inner sense “provides the subject with intuitions of itself as a physical body; 
that, for Kant, is possible only through outer intuition.”22 In other words, inner sense 
provides us with our location, not through the location of our body, but instead as a “mere 
point of view.”23 However, I do not believe that Kant operates with the notion of a 
spatiotemporal location independently of the location of our body. At least in his 
metaphysics lectures, Kant seems precisely to deny that we can locate ourselves without 
locating our body in outer intuition. Kant is pointing out that as pure intelligence, i.e., 
apperception, I have no location. What he then goes on to say, it seems to me, is that it is 
only through the location of my body that I have a location in space and time: “As 
intelligence, I am at no location, for location is a relation of outer intuition, but as 
intelligence I am not an outer object which can be determined with respect to relation. My 
location in the world is thus determined by the location of my body in the world, for 
whatever is to appear and stand in outer relation must be a body.”24  
The main problem with Valaris’ interpretation, from my perspective, is that it attempts to 
cash out the notion of “perspectival awareness” in spatiotemporal terms. Thereby it has 
difficulty accounting for the asymmetries between space and time, and it must claim that 
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inner sense provides us with a location in space and time independently of the location of our 
body. Nonetheless, I believe that the underlying idea is correct: My own unified 
interpretation of inner sense will also be based upon the idea of a “point of view.” I will, 
however, approach this idea from a different angle, dispensing with Valaris’ claim that the 
point of view is spatiotemporal. To see how this is possible, I want to draw attention to an 
example from the metaphysical tradition: one that, first of all, has a “point of view” without 
that point of view being defined in terms of a spatiotemporal location, and secondly, is 
already implicated in the argumentation of the Critique: the monad. 
2.3 The Monadic Point of View 
The Amphiboly (A260/B316ff.) is an appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, where Kant, 
among other things, launches his most thorough critique of Leibniz and his followers. In the 
course of this critique, he repeatedly refers to inner sense. In the first part of this section, I 
will argue that these references provide us with a clue to understanding the sense of “inner” 
relevant to Kant’s theory of inner sense: Kant claims that the inner state of the monad is 
analogous to the determination of our inner sense. The second part of this section will 
therefore look at the inner state of the monad, to find out what the analogy consists in, and 
where it breaks down. 
2.3.1 Inner Determinations 
Let us first of all look at the relevant passages from the Amphiboly. There are three of them, 
and they all follow the same basic pattern. In them, Kant recounts Leibniz’ position, by 
describing the reasoning behind the latter’s postulation of monads, that is, simple mental 
substances. In the first of the relevant passages, he writes: 
As object of the pure understanding, on the contrary, every substance must have inner determinations 
and forces that pertain to its inner reality. Yet what can I think of as inner accidents except for those 
which my inner sense offers me? – namely that which is either itself thinking or which is analogous to 
one. Thus because he represented them as noumena, taking away in thought everything that might 
signify outer relation, thus even composition, Leibniz made out of all substances, even the constituents 
of matter, simple subjects gifted with powers of representation, in a word, monads. (A265-266/B321-
322) 
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I take it that there are three relevant steps in the reasoning Kant attributes to Leibniz. The 
first is that substances must have “inner determinations.” The second step is to say that we 
must therefore rule out all determinations that are based upon outer relations; this includes 
composition, and thereby everything in space. The third step is what interests us: Thus, we 
cannot think of any candidate for these inner determinations “except for those which my 
inner sense offers me” (A266/B321), and the substances must therefore have powers of 
representation.  
We shall not analyze the first two steps here; suffice it to say that Kant agrees that the second 
step follows from the first, i.e., that everything in space ultimately consists of outer relations, 
but disagrees with the first step itself, i.e., that a substance must have inner determinations. 
This comes out clearly in the following passage: “A persistent appearance in space 
(impenetrable extension) contains mere relations and nothing absolutely internal, and 
nevertheless can be the primary substratum of all outer perception” (A284/B340).  
As to the third step, Kant seems to be saying that it follows from the first and the second: If 
we believe that substances must have inner determinations, then we can find examples of 
such determinations only through our inner sense. In order for us to understand better what 
this means, I will quote what Kant says about this third step in the other passages from the 
Amphiboly:   
we can therefore attribute to the substances no other inner state than that through which we internally 
determine our sense itself, namely the state of representations. This completes the monads 
(A274/B330).  
since we are not acquainted with any absolutely inner determinations except through our inner sense, 
this substratum would be not only simple, but also (according to the analogy with our inner sense) 
determined through representations, i.e., all things would really be monads, or simple beings 
endowed with representations. (A283/B339-340)  
What is at least clear from these passages is that Kant believes that Leibniz arrives at the 
inner state of the monads through something like an “analogy” with our inner sense.25 But I 
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think that this analogy can be read in two different ways. The first reading would be to say 
that what inner sense offers us are representations. Thus, Kant’s point is simply that if we are 
acquainted with inner determinations through inner sense, this means that inner 
determinations are representations.  
But if we believe, as I suggested in the previous chapter, that inner sense might have 
something to do with point of view, then a more interesting reading becomes possible. This 
reading would interpret Kant’s reference to “the state of representations” (A274/B330) not as 
the state of having representations, but rather as the state of these representations themselves. 
This is because it is the state of representations in Leibniz’ monads that constitute its point of 
view. In order to understand what this means, and whether it is a plausible reading of the 
passages in question, we must ask: What does the point of view of a monad consist in? 
2.3.2 Monads and the state of representations 
As we can see from Kant’s description, the monad is a simple, immaterial substance.26 
Leibniz’ justification for postulating these substances are as follows:  
I perceived that it is impossible to find the principles of a true unity in matter alone, or in what is only 
passive, since everything in it is only a collection or aggregation of parts to infinity. Now, a multitude 
can derive its reality only from true unities, which have some other origin and are considerably 
different from [[mathematical]] points [[which are only the extremities and modifications of 
extension,]] which all agree cannot make up the continuum. Therefore, in order to find these real 
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entities I was forced to have recourse to a formal atom, since a material thing cannot be both material 
and, at the same time, perfectly indivisible, that is, endowed with a true unity.27  
In this quote, we recognize the second step of Kant’s summary above; since every material 
thing (i.e., thing in space) is always composed of parts, the substances (or “real entities” in 
Leibniz’ quote) cannot be material. 
Why does he then think that monads must be thinking substances? Bennett suggests that 
Leibniz argues from the unity of the “I”: 
When expounding the simplicity of substances, he conspicuously resorts to the first person singular. 
Evidently he found the simplicity of the soul to be especially obvious in his own case, and expected 
you to find it especially obvious in yours, and me in mine. This explains why he was irresistibly drawn 
to think that minds are monads.28 
If this is right, then it is similar to the reasoning behind Kant’s principle of the unity of 
apperception, except Kant does not take apperception to be a substance. But when Kant, in 
the passage we quoted above, explains this third step that brings Leibniz to think of monads 
as “simple beings endowed with representations” (A283/B340), or as “determined through 
representations” (A283/B339-340), he intimated that it was inner sense rather than 
apperception that brought Leibniz to this conclusion. 
I think this fact supports the second reading I proposed above. My suggestion is that whereas 
apperception could have brought Leibniz to believe that monads were “simple beings 
endowed with representations” (A283/B340), only inner sense could have brought him to 
believe that the monads were “determined through representations” (A283/B339-340, 
emphasis mine). Of course, Leibniz does not distinguish between these, since he does not 
distinguish between inner sense and apperception.29 But Kant does distinguish between 
them, and when he refers to inner sense when explicating Leibniz, it seems likely that this is 
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because he wants to emphasize not merely that monads have representations, but that they 
are determined through representations, they have a state of representations.  
And in fact, as Kant would have been aware of, in Leibniz’ metaphysical system each monad 
represents the entire universe. He says that “everything conspires together,” and that “eyes as 
piercing as those of God could read the whole sequence of the universe in the smallest of 
substances.”30 This seems to lead to what Bennett calls the “collapse problem”: “to find a 
way for Leibniz to prevent the monads from being indistinguishable from one another and 
thus – by the identity of indiscernibles – collapsing into one.”31 Thus we realize that what 
Kant would call the “determination” of a monad’s inner state (Leibniz might instead say its 
“individuation”) cannot be the particular representations it has, for the simple reason that 
since every monad represents the entire universe, all monads have the same representations. 
What does distinguish one monad from another is the state of its representations, i.e., its 
point of view.  
First of all, it is clear that this point of view is not spatiotemporal. “Leibniz does not think 
that monads are literally at distances from one another, because he assigns all spatiality to the 
level of ‘well-founded appearance’ or to the even less basic level of the ‘ideal’. So a monad’s 
point of view is not a point in space.”32 Instead, the point of view is constituted by a 
qualitative feature of the representations: whether they are clear or obscure, distinct or 
indistinct. As humans, we have some clear and distinct representations, but most of them we 
are not even conscious of at all, they are what Leibniz calls tiny perceptions [petites 
perceptions], since “at every moment there is an infinity of perceptions in us, but without 
apperception and without reflection.”33 And every individual monad has its own unique 
distribution of clarity and distinctness among its representations: “While all monads perceive 
the whole universe, and thus in a sense agree in terms of the content of their perceptions, 
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they necessarily differ in terms of their point of view; that is, they differ in terms of the 
distribution of clarity and distinctness over their perceptual states.”34 
Now, if we turn our attention back toward the Amphiboly, we recall that Kant claimed: “we 
can therefore attribute to the substances no other inner state than that through which we 
internally determine our sense itself, namely the state of representations” (A274/B330). 
What I have suggested is that the “inner state” that Kant has in mind, the one Leibniz 
attributes to his monads, is a point of view, a “distribution of clarity and distinctness over 
their perceptual states.” If this is correct, and Leibniz gets this by considering our inner 
sense, then we must also draw a conclusion about what it means to “internally determine our 
sense,” i.e., what a determination of inner sense is. I suggest the following: A determination 
of inner sense is a determination of the qualitative state of our representations; as clear or 
obscure, distinct or indistinct. The distribution of these states over the different 
representations constitutes the point of view of the monad, and it also constitutes the point of 
view provided by the determination of our inner sense. Thus, when Kant says that inner 
sense provides us with intuitions of “our inner state” (A33/B49), he does not mean merely 
the state of having representations, but more significantly, he means the state of these 
representations, i.e., their state of clarity or obscurity, distinctness or indistinctness.   
This connection between inner sense and the clarity and distinctness of representations is, as 
far as I am aware of, a novel hypothesis. I have therefore decided on the following procedure, 
which will be executed in chapter 3:  
In 3.1, I will explicate what is meant by “clarity” and “distinctness.” Part of the motivation 
for the section is to show that clarity and distinctness are interesting, and important, Kantian 
notions in the first place. The reason that this is an important task is that it is not at all 
obvious on the surface. In fact, judging by the commentators I am aware of, it is something 
that will be met with almost unanimous disagreement. Perhaps the main reason is that Kant’s 
references to the notions of clarity and distinctness in the Critique are nearly always 
dismissive. Indeed, one of his points against the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition seems to be 
precisely that while these concepts were thought to be important, this alleged importance is 
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in fact completely wrong-headed. In other words, my goal in this section is to show that 
appearances are misleading, and that Kant’s point, as often when it comes to his rationalist 
predecessors, the German Schulphilosophen, is not to dismiss the entire tradition and all it 
stood for, but rather to profoundly transform the tradition and its concomitant framework of 
concepts from the inside. In explicating Kant’s theory of clarity and distinctness, two things 
will become apparent: First of all, that Kant believes clarity and distinctness to be a matter of 
degree, moreover, this degree corresponds to a degree of consciousness. Secondly, that there 
is a complicated relation between aesthetic and logical clarity and distinctness, i.e., between 
the clarity of intuitions and the clarity of concepts.35 I will begin to approach this relation in 
this section, but will have to return to it in later chapters, e.g., 3.3 and 4.1.  
In 3.2, I will investigate the status of the degree of clarity and distinctness of representations. 
As we have seen, Kant rejects the first step that leads Leibniz to his monads and their inner 
state – namely, he rejects that substances must have absolutely inner determinations. And in 
fact, Kant does not see the degree of clarity and distinctness of our representations as the 
determination of our self or “soul,” considered as a simple, mental substance. I will argue 
that the reason the degree of clarity is a determination of inner sense is because Kant 
considers the degree of clarity to be a sensation. As such, it is what Kant calls an intensive 
magnitude. And corresponding to this sensation is, according to Kant, the intensive 
magnitude of consciousness. What this means is that we should see the notions of clarity and 
distinctness in light of the categories of quality, and their principle of intensive magnitude, 
and correspondingly, we must also reconsider the categories of quality and their principle in 
light of the notion of the clarity and distinctness of representations.  
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 This distinction between intuitions and concepts lies at the very heart of Kant’s critical philosophy. In short, intuitions 
are singular representations, they relate immediately to a single object, and they are “grounded on the receptivity of 
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through being applied to or “subsuming” the objects of intuitions, and they are “grounded on the spontaneity of thinking” 
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3. Clarity and Consciousness 
3.1 Kant’s Theory of Clarity and Distinctness 
The task of this chapter is, as mentioned, to explicate the notions of clarity and distinctness 
in Kant, and to defend their role within his philosophy. It seems appropriate, however, to 
begin by displaying the passages where Kant is often thought to have denounced any 
important role for these concepts in the critical project. 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant takes the rationalist philosophy to task in the following 
manner:  
The Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy has therefore directed all investigations of the nature and origin of 
our cognitions to an entirely unjust point of view in considering the distinction between sensibility and 
the intellectual as merely logical, since it is obviously transcendental, and does not concern merely the 
form of distinctness or indistinctness, but its origin and content, so that through sensibility we do not 
cognize the constitution of things in themselves merely indistinctly, but rather not at all (A44/B61-62).  
And, just before this passage: “The difference between an indistinct and a distinct 
representation is merely logical, and does not concern the content” (A43/B60-61). As is 
apparent from these statements, Kant’s overriding concern is the distinction between 
sensibility and understanding, on the one hand, and the distinction between appearances and 
things in themselves, on the other. And neither of these distinctions have anything to do with 
the clarity and distinctness of representations, which is relegated to a “merely logical” role. 
This kind of relegation is symptomatic for the way in which Kant refers to clarity and 
distinctness throughout the Critique. In a similar fashion, in the Amphiboly we find that the 
“logical reflection” as well as the “logical topics” of traditional logic must be amended by 
the prior execution of a transcendental reflection, and a transcendental topic. And it is the 
transcendental reflection which is a proper part of the critical philosophy.  
Moreover, the dismissal of clarity and distinctness as important notions seems to be rooted in 
the most fundamental differences between the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy and Kant’s 
own: A theory which sees sensibility and understanding as two inner modes of cognizing the 
things in themselves, with sensibility being the confused mode and understanding the clear 
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and distinct one (i.e., the Leibnizian-Wolffian theory), will place great importance on the 
distinct/indistinct distinction. A theory in which sensibility and understanding are two 
radically separate sources of representations, both of which are, because we are dependent 
upon outer affection, limited to appearances when providing cognition (the Kantian one), 
will have a completely different emphasis. But does this mean that there is no work left to be 
done by the distinction between the distinct and the indistinct, the clear and the obscure?  
First of all, we note what Kant does not say. And he does not actually claim that these 
distinctions are mistaken, that they have no application at all. Rather, they are “merely 
logical.” According to Kant, the Leibnizians characterize the distinction between sensibility 
and intellect as “merely logical,” whereas Kant himself characterizes the difference between 
distinct and indistinct representations as “merely logical.” It seems that what Kant intends by 
this is something like “merely a difference of degree,” rather than a difference of kind. Now 
it should be clear that even if Kant wants to emphasize the differences of kind (between 
sensibility and understanding, for instance), this does not mean that he denies the existence 
of differences of degree. And if we look at his logic lectures, we can confirm that Kant does 
indeed have a specific conception of clarity and distinctness. So what does Kant say about 
them? In the Jäsche Logic, he characterizes the difference between clear and obscure 
representations thus: “If I am conscious of the representation, it is clear, if I am not conscious 
of it, obscure.”36 A similar view is proposed in the Anthropology; interestingly, Kant’s 
remarks there are directed against Locke, which places him very close indeed to the context 
of Leibniz and his New Essays.37 And Kant, like Leibniz, affirms against Locke that  
We can still be indirectly conscious of having a representation, even if we are not directly conscious of 
it. – Such representations are then called obscure; the others are clear, and when their clarity also 
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extends to the partial representations that make up a whole together with their connection, they are then 
called distinct representations, whether of thought or intuition.38 
As we can see, here Kant also outlines the difference between clarity, on the one hand, and 
distinctness, on the other. However, before we proceed to that, one other question needs to 
be asked, namely, what is the precise definition of clarity? In the quote from the Jäsche 
Logic, Kant says that the representations of which we are not conscious, are obscure. In the 
Anthropology, he says that we are indirectly conscious of obscure representations. We might 
think that these expressions are somehow equivalent. In any case, they seem to be 
contradicted by the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant notes that: “Clarity is not, as the 
logicians say, the consciousness of a representation” (B414n.). It is rather, he claims, the 
consciousness of a difference between the representation and others. Similarly, in the 
Anthropology, he states: “Consciousness of one’s representations that suffices for the 
distinction of one object from another is clarity.”39 I believe we can distinguish three 
definitions of clarity from the different texts, which I will list by the progressively increasing 
strength of the requirements, where each definition adds an additional requirement to the 
previous: 1) In the Logic, a representation is clear if we are conscious of it. 2) In the 
Anthropology, we must also be able to distinguish the representation from another. 3) In the 
Critique, we must in addition be conscious of the difference by which we distinguish the 
representation from another. It is reasonable to take the final view as constituting Kant’s 
considered opinion, since it is given in the Critique and since it explicitly addresses each of 
the other two conceptions, stating their inadequacy. Thus, he says that: “Clarity is not, as the 
logicians say, the consciousness of a representation” (B414n., emphasis mine), against the 
view proposed in the Logic. And later in the footnote: “To be sure, if this consciousness 
suffices for a distinction, but not for a consciousness of the difference, then the 
representation must still be called obscure” (B415n.), which directly addresses and goes 
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against the view proposed in the Anthropology. We should therefore understand the critical 
criteria for clarity to include consciousness, distinction, and consciousness of difference. 
In the following paragraphs I will develop and defend the following claims: 1) The critical 
view of clarity implies that clarity is a matter of degrees. 2) The distinction between clarity 
and distinctness thereby becomes a difference in degree, not a difference in kind. 3) From 
this we will conclude that both clarity and distinctness are specifications corresponding to a 
scale of degrees of consciousness (similarly to how warmth is a specification on the scale of 
temperature).This implies that the representations we are indirectly conscious of (the obscure 
representations) are also characterized by a degree of consciousness (comparable to how 
there are also cold, i.e. not-warm, representations, with a varying degree of coldness).40 
3.1.1 Clarity 
In the B414-415 footnote, Kant gives examples of representations that are not clear, though 
we are conscious of them. The examples are representations that would qualify for clarity on 
the view suggested in the Anthropology, but not for the stricter definition expounded in the 
Critique, i.e., representations where a distinction can be made, but without a consciousness 
of the difference involved. One of the examples concern the concepts “right” and “equity.” 
The point Kant is making seems to be the following: We differentiate between “right” and 
“equity,” so that we sometimes use the one concept, sometimes the other. And not merely in 
a random manner, rather we judge “right” to be more appropriate in some contexts, “equity” 
in others. But though we differentiate between them in this way, we are not able to say 
exactly why we do so, we are not able to say what the difference is that causes the concepts 
to have different appropriate usages. In other words, we can make a distinction between these 
concepts, but we have no consciousness of the difference between them. “A consciousness of 
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the difference” in the context of the footnote must mean, I believe, that one can clearly 
represent the difference. 41 
What is important to notice here is that it does not seem possible to say that the concept of 
“right” is obscure, period. For it is essential to Kant’s example that the concept compared to 
“right” is “equity” rather than, for instance, “chair.” It is undeniable that we are conscious of 
differences between the concepts “right” and “chair,” i.e., only one of them is the concept of 
a material object. In this respect, then, the concept of “right” must be considered clear. And 
this point, I think, generalizes. For something to be clear, then, we must have some mark 
(Merkmal)42 that can be either affirmed or negated of it; otherwise there is no way of being 
conscious of a difference between it and anything else. But beyond that, everything becomes 
a question of degree. That is to say, in comparison to a specific representation, the question 
of clarity is either-or (i.e., “right” is clear when compared to “chair,” obscure when compared 
to “equity”); but the representation as such (e.g., the concept of “right”) has a degree of 
clarity, as measured by considering how many other concepts it is clear when compared with. 
The same point holds, I would argue, when considering intuitions rather than concepts (in 
other words, when it is aesthetic rather than logical clarity that is considered). Kant’s other 
example in the B414-415 footnote is of this kind: It refers to “a musician who, when 
improvising, hits many notes at the same time” (B415n.). The point seems to be that even 
though the musician does not have a clear representation of each of the notes that he is 
playing, he is nonetheless conscious of each of them – otherwise, it would not be explainable 
that all the notes fit together in harmony. In other words, though he can distinguish between 
the particular combination that he plays and a slightly different one, he might be unable to 
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specify the combination clearly, as would be required for writing the composition down, for 
example.   
Similarly to the conceptual example, it is important here that the comparison is between the 
particular combination of notes that he plays and a slightly different combination of notes. 
For the comparison might instead be between the specific combination of notes and tapping a 
rhythm with your feet. Surely, in that case the musician would not only notice that there was 
a difference, but would also be capable of specifying what the difference was, i.e., he would 
be conscious of the difference. Though the exact combination of notes might elude him, the 
specification of them as, say, notes on a piano, rather than the tapping of feet, should be clear 
enough. So, like in the conceptual example, while in comparison to a specific representation, 
the question of clarity is either-or (i.e., a particular note in a combination of notes is clear 
when compared to the tapping of feet, obscure when compared to a slightly different note); 
but the representation as such (i.e., the particular note) has a degree of clarity, measured by 
the amount of other sounds it is clear when compared with.43  
3.1.2 Clarity and Distinctness 
What is, then, the difference between clarity and distinctness? In the Jäsche Logic, Kant 
says: “All clear representations, to which alone logical rules can be applied, can now be 
distinguished in regard to distinctness or indistinctness. If we are conscious of the whole 
representation, but not of the manifold that is contained in it, then the representation is 
indistinct.”44 In the Anthropology, as we have seen, he also begins from clear representations, 
and says: “When their clarity also extends to the partial representations that make up a whole 
together with their connection, they are then called distinct representations.”45 In the 
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Critique, however, there is no explicit definition of the notion of distinctness. As far as I can 
see, the revised definition of clarity in the Critique ensures that the concepts “clarity” and 
“distinctness” are mutually entailing in a way that correlates the degree of clarity with the 
degree of distinctness. From the definitions of clarity given in the Logic and the 
Anthropology, the difference is more significant, because what made a representation clear 
did not seem to have much to do with its distinctness or indistinctness. When it comes to the 
definition given in the Critique, however, this is no longer the case. For what does it mean to 
be conscious of the difference between a representation and another? For Kant, it can only 
mean that we are conscious of a mark that is present in one of the representations compared 
and absent in the other. That is to say, only by being conscious of a mark (like “material 
object”) that is a part of the intension of the concept “chair” but not of the concept “right” 
can these concepts be clear when compared to one another. But this means that the partial 
representation “material object” must be clearly noted in the concept “chair,” and the 
negation must be clearly noted in the concept “right.” In other words, the degree of clarity 
presupposes and is strongly correlated with the degree of distinctness, because the degree of 
distinctness determines the amount of differences that can be consciously noted. 
But is there not a regress problem here? If the clarity of a representation presupposes the 
clarity of one of its partial representations, then the clarity of the partial representation also 
presupposes the clarity of one of its partial representations, and so on. Thus the conclusion 
seems to follow that if anything is to be clear, then we must regress through the partial 
representations contained in the concepts’ intension, that is, in the direction of increasingly 
abstract concepts, until we arrive at “being” or “nothing,” the most general concepts. And 
here we can go no further; we find no partial representation bringing these concepts to 
clarity. How, then, can any concept be clear? Fortunately, there is in fact another source of 
difference than the one we have been relying on so far. As Kant points out in the Amphiboly, 
there is the possibility of numerical difference without conceptual difference, based upon 
different location in space. Basically, once we can localize a being46 in space, and subsume 
the intuition of this being under the concept, the individuating character of the spatial 
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intuition will provide the needed clarity. In other words, the extension of a concept is 
ultimately what makes us able to differentiate it from other concepts. What this suggests, 
then, is that clear concepts ultimately depend upon clear intuitions, and the subsumption of 
the objects of these intuitions under the concepts in question. For once an intuition has been 
consciously subsumed under one concept and not under another, the consciousness of 
difference needed for clarity is provided. The reasoning provided here gives us a grasp of 
Kant’s oft-repeated assertion that concepts are in some sense empty, they have no sense or 
meaning, if they do not apply to intuitions. Ultimately, it is only by distinguishing concepts 
based on their application to objects (this object is a chair rather than a table) that the 
concepts have meaning.47  
3.1.3 Clarity, Distinctness and Consciousness 
Now, we need to give an account of the relation between the concepts of clarity and 
distinctness (which, as we have seen, become entangled in each other in the Critique) and 
consciousness. Consciousness is obviously implicated in these concepts; clarity means a 
consciousness of the difference and so on. Nonetheless, we cannot presume that 
consciousness can be accounted for in terms of clarity and distinctness. For while clarity 
implies distinctness, and vice versa, consciousness seems prima facie to imply neither clarity 
nor distinctness. Obscure representations, that are neither clear nor distinct, nonetheless have 
a degree of consciousness. “A certain degree of consciousness, which, however, is not 
sufficient for memory, must be met with even in some obscure representations” (B414n.). 
Before we try to account for this, let us look at what Kant says about obscure representations.  
As previously mentioned, Kant affirms the existence of obscure representations in the 
Anthropology. And the reason he gives is this:  
When I am conscious of seeing a human being far away from me in a meadow, even though I am not 
conscious of seeing his eyes, nose, mouth, etc., I properly conclude that this thing is a human being. 
For if I wanted to maintain that I do not at all have the representation of him in my intuition because I 
am not conscious of perceiving these parts of his head (and so also the remaining parts of this human 
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being), then I would also not be able to say that I see a human being, since the representation of the 
whole (of the head or of the human being) is composed of these partial ideas.48 
By reiterating the sentiment expressed here, the conclusion seems to follow that the parts of 
the eye, nose, mouth, etc., the parts of those parts, and so on, are also obscurely represented. 
And so on to infinity? I see no way of avoiding that conclusion. While this might initially 
seem to give rise to a problem of infinite divisibility, I believe that it actually fits the 
discussion of this topic in the Second Antinomy. The antinomy consists in the fact that we 
can prove matter to be both infinitely divisible and consist of smallest parts; these proofs 
seem to contradict each other. In the solution to the Antinomy, Kant affirms that all the 
infinitely many parts of the intuition are contained in the whole, but then says: “Though all 
the parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, the whole division is not contained in it; 
this division consists only in the progressive decomposition, or in the regress itself, which 
first makes the series actual” (A524/B552). It seems plausible, then, to identify the infinitely 
many obscure partial representations with the parts that are not yet divided.  
So it seems that we have an indeterminately large amount of obscure representations: the 
parts, parts of parts, parts of parts of parts, etc., of the clear intuitions we have. How are these 
obscure representations related to consciousness? In the Anthropology Kant proposes the 
view that we might be indirectly conscious of our obscure representations, whereas we are 
directly conscious of the clear ones. As we have seen, the revised definition of the Critique 
classifies more representations as obscure than the Anthropology does. Still, it might adhere 
to the same distinction between direct and indirect consciousness. However, we have also 
suggested that in the Critique, it is all a question of degree. For as I have tried to show, the 
clarity of representations becomes a matter of degree, and by implication (if what is obscure 
is conceived of as what is not-clear), so does the obscurity of representations. To be concise: 
To the degree that a representation is not clear, it is obscure. Perhaps this means that the 
distinction between what we are directly vs. what we are indirectly conscious of also 
becomes a difference in degree. Another possibility is that we can still make sense of the 
direct/indirect distinction on the following basis: We can determine something either 
positively or negatively, i.e., by determining what it is or what it is not; Kant distinguishes 
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between affirmative and negative judgments (A70/B95). Something that we are directly 
conscious of might be something we are capable of determining affirmatively, whereas 
something we are indirectly conscious of might be something we are only capable of 
determining negatively. Whether this proposal is plausible is difficult to discern.  
In any case, one question must be considered before we can evaluate the relation between 
clarity and consciousness: Can a completely obscure representation still be accompanied by 
varying degrees of consciousness? First, we need to be clear about what a completely 
obscure representation would be. According to what we have already said, complete 
obscurity would imply that the representation is not clear in comparison to anything. This 
should mean that we cannot give any positive or negative judgment about the marks or 
partial representations contained in the representation in question. This is of course not the 
case for the eyes, nose, mouth, etc., of Kant’s example. We are, for instance, conscious of the 
difference between the representation of the nose and the representation of, say, a strong 
flashlight turned toward the observer; i.e., we can clearly judge that what we presume to be 
the nose is not a flashlight, because we are conscious of a difference between the 
representation of the nose and the representation of the flashlight (a difference in the 
intensity of light, presumably). I think, however, that this line of argument can be expanded 
so as to show that no intuitive representation is completely obscure. For spatiotemporal 
representations that we do not clearly distinguish from their surroundings – say, the minute 
sounds that each drop of water makes when it is moving toward the shore, as per Leibniz’ 
famous example of tiny perceptions – are at least clear in the sense that we are conscious of 
the difference between them and huge perceptions. That is to say, compared to the noise of a 
gigantic explosion, the minute sound of the drop of water is indeed clear, because we are 
conscious of the difference between the minute sound and the huge blast (a difference in 
sound level). Of course, this does not prevent representations from getting increasingly 
obscure. We know that our representation of whatever lies on the other side of the Milky 
Way is not a light source strong enough to be as visible as our Sun from here on Earth; this 
does not amount to what we would call a “clear” representation in any normal sense of that 
word.  
The main point here is that everything adds up to what we perceive: there is thus no intuitive 
representation that is completely obscure to us, because there is always a way in which that 
representation could have been different to such an extent that what we perceive would be 
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different (in a way we were conscious of). And insofar as we have seen concepts to be 
ultimately reliant upon intuitions for their clarity, and moreover that all concepts arise only 
through sensory experience (though not necessarily from sensory experience), the same 
should hold for conceptual representations.  
From this I conclude as follows: If the interpretation given so far is largely correct, the 
degree of consciousness, degree of clarity, and degree of distinctness all seem to be strictly 
correlated. Hence, I will from now on mostly refer to these degrees as “degrees of clarity,” 
and summarize what we have so far in the following proposition: the magnitude of 
consciousness corresponds to the degree of clarity of representations. What this means is 
that I take the degree of clarity/distinctness/consciousness over the sum total distribution of 
representations present in the mind to correspond to the magnitude of consciousness.  
The possibility of developing, as I have done above, a theory of clarity and distinctness 
within Kant’s framework, does not yet tell us whether there is any use or demand for such a 
theory in the critical philosophy. However, I believe that this can easily be affirmed: for 
instance by looking at Charles Parsons’ article on “Infinity and Kant’s Conception of the 
‘Possibility of Experience’,”49 which points to a possible problem in Kant’s theory of the 
infinity of time and space. The problem centres on the issue of infinite divisibility. If space 
and time, as forms of intuition, are infinitely divisible, does this imply that any intuition has 
an infinite amount of information? And when Kant says that “as contained in one moment 
no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity” (A99), does this mean that 
we only apprehend simple parts in instants, and through a succession of these “build up” the 
manifold of intuition? In attempting a solution to these quandaries, Parsons says that “we 
have to make a distinction which Kant does not explicitly make and which has some 
consequences which I am not sure that Kant would have accepted.”50 And this distinction is 
that between what is taken in explicitly and what is only taken in implicitly. Making such a 
distinction answers the questions posed above by saying that our intuition has a potentially 
infinite amount of information (but most of it is implicit), and that the simple parts are the 
absolute unity of explicitly given impressions (which nonetheless contain implicitly given 
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parts). Parsons goes on to equate this distinction with that between the “figure” and “ground” 
of Gestalt psychology. As we have seen, he also takes it to be the case that such a distinction 
is not present in Kant, and perhaps is even something that Kant would not have accepted. As 
I will proceed to show, however, the reason Kant does not have or accept such a distinction 
is that he already has similar but better and more widely applicable tools: Precisely the 
notion of the degree of clarity and distinctness of representations.  
First of all, Parsons’ distinction does not amount to a full explanation of why Kant 
characterizes a representation as “absolute unity” when contained within one moment; the 
spatial unity of a representation in which one can distinguish no explicit parts seems to be 
relative. That is, insofar as Parsons ascribes the unity to the spatial representation, this unity 
can only be relative. But as I will expound further in chapter 3.2, the degree of clarity of 
representations, on the other hand, must be taken as sensations, with an intensive magnitude. 
And what is distinctive about intensive, as opposed to extensive, magnitudes, is that they are 
indeed absolute unities in the sense that they are not composed of parts outside one another 
(partes extra partes). Instead, they have a degree. In his late metaphysics lectures, Kant 
explicitly phrases the contrast between extensive and intensive magnitude as that between 
magnitude of the unity versus magnitude of the plurality: 
One determines the degree better this way: magnitude of the unity, i.e., the representation of an object, 
insofar as I think its magnitude (quantity <quantitatem>) as unity, provides the degree of the 
magnitude. Thus the magnitude is given here not as plurality, but rather as unity and distinguishes itself 
precisely from extensive magnitude.51 
And Kant is moreover clear that sensation is apprehended in a moment: “Apprehension, 
merely by means of sensation, fills only an instant” (A167/B209). It is therefore natural to 
assume that the absolute unities contained in one moment must be sensations. But as we 
have seen, this does not mean that they do not have a magnitude, i.e., the “magnitude of the 
unity.”  
Secondly, while “figure” and “ground” are sensible, spatial determinations, clarity and 
distinctness apply to all representations, sensible and conceptual alike. As we have already 
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seen, Kant allows for both aesthetical and logical clarity. But in contrast to the usual 
treatment of these terms among commentators, the interpretation proposed here can at the 
same time affirm that there must be some connection between aesthetic and logical clarity. 
And there are good reasons for seeing this as an advantage. In general, it seems hard to deny 
that since experience requires a combination of intuitions and concepts, this must also imply 
some relation between the clarity exhibited by intuitions and the clarity of concepts. And a 
consideration of the role that the concepts of reflection play in the formation of empirical 
concepts should make this even more obvious. The comparison of empirical intuitions with a 
view toward forming empirical concepts, performed by means of the concepts of reflection, 
imply that the relations falling under the concepts of reflection (identity or difference, 
conflict or agreement, etc.) are relations that are consciously apprehended in the empirical 
intuitions themselves. In other words, for a concept involving a certain set of predicates to be 
formed, empirical intuitions more or less clearly exhibiting those sets of predicates as 
aesthetic features must be presupposed.52 We have already seen that the interpretation given 
here is germane to these considerations; one connection between the clarity of concepts and 
the clarity of intuitions has already been exposed, namely, the fact that the clarity of concepts 
ultimately depend upon the clarity of intuitions.  
In chapter 3.3, I will expand further on this idea of a relation between aesthetic and logical 
clarity, by interpreting the “act of attention” as an act which enables us to bring aesthetic 
clarity to concepts.  But before this, I will in the next chapter develop further the idea that the 
degree of clarity of our representations is an intensive magnitude.  
3.2 The Intensive Magnitude of Consciousness 
Chapter 2 presented the initial case for thinking that a determination of inner sense might be 
a determination of the degree of clarity of representations. In 3.1, we have now seen how 
Kant’s theory of clarity and distinctness works, and we have also begun to see its connection 
to consciousness. But whereas we can perhaps see why the degree of clarity of a 
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representation is inner, it is more problematic to understand why it is a determination of 
inner sense; what does the representation of the concept of “right” have to do with 
sensibility? In the present section, I will attempt to resolve this difficulty by showing how the 
degree of clarity and distinctness must be, and is, subsumed under the category of reality. It 
is for this reason that the degree of clarity of representations constitutes an intensive 
magnitude, corresponding to the intensive magnitude of consciousness.  
The three categories of quality (reality, negation, and limitation), when applied to our 
sensible conditions a priori (i.e., as so-called schematized categories), give rise to a 
principle. This principle is presented and defended in the Anticipations of Perception, and 
goes as follows: “In all appearances the real, which is an object of the sensation, has 
intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree” (B207). In 5.2 we will return to discuss this principle in 
detail; for now, it suffices to emphasize the contrast between on the one hand, the categories 
of quality that give rise to the principle of intensive magnitude, and on the other hand, the 
categories of quantity that give rise to the principle of extensive magnitude. An extensive 
magnitude is an aggregate of parts, whereas an intensive magnitude is a coalition of degrees. 
In other words, an intensive magnitude is not constituted of mutually external parts. As Kant 
says, in an intensive magnitude “the magnitude is given here not as plurality, but rather as 
unity and distinguishes itself precisely from extensive magnitude.”53 
It therefore comes as something of a surprise when Kant, in the Transcendental Dialectic, 
consistently relates the categories of quality to the question of parts and wholes. And indeed, 
Kant himself remarks, toward the end of the A paralogisms, after summarizing the 
“sophistical doctrine of the soul,” i.e., the claims of rational psychology that he has 
criticized: “How the simple here once again corresponds to the category of reality, I cannot 
yet show, but rather it will be proved in the following chapter, on the occasion of another use 
by reason of the very same concept” (A404). Thus, we can clearly expect an explanation for 
this correspondence to appear in the “following chapter,” that is to say, in the Antinomies. 
What we find is the following:  
Reality in space, i.e., matter, is likewise something conditioned, whose inner conditions are its parts, 
and the parts of those parts are the remote conditions, so that there occurs here a regressive synthesis, 
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whose absolute totality reason demands; and that cannot occur otherwise than through a complete 
division, in which the reality of matter either disappears into nothing or else into that which is no 
longer matter, namely the simple (A413/B440). 
 Now in the context of a general explanation for the correspondence of the simple to the 
category of reality, the argument Kant gives here suffers from at least one fatal flaw. Namely, 
that it is explicitly limited to reality in space. It is difficult to believe that Kant would have 
considered an argument about reality in space to be an explanation for how to deal with 
reality in the Paralogisms, where it is the soul, as an object of inner sense, that is in question. 
Nonetheless, that is what we find.54 It should be remarked that there is no similar reference to 
a general explanation for the correspondence of the category of reality with the simple in the 
B Paralogisms, perhaps suggesting that Kant himself saw its inadequacy. But that just leaves 
us where we were, with no explanation for this strange correspondence.  
We can, however, perhaps unearth a connection between talk of parts and wholes and the 
categories of quality. This connection has to go through the topic of our previous section, 
namely, clear and distinct representations. Witness, for instance, a passage where Kant 
discusses an indistinct representation:  
We glimpse a country house in the distance. If we are conscious that the intuited object is a house, then 
we must necessarily have a representation of the various parts of this house, the windows, doors, etc. 
For if we did not see the parts, we would not see the house itself either. But we are not conscious of 
this representation of the manifold of its parts, and our representation of the object indicated is thus 
itself an indistinct representation.55  
Whereas the parts of the house themselves are extensive magnitudes, the degree of clarity of 
these parts, and thereby the degree of clarity of the representation of the house, is an 
intensive magnitude.56 In other words, the part-whole relation can be connected to the 
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categories of quality through the degree of consciousness accompanying the representation of 
the wholes and parts. The key to understanding why wholes and parts are suddenly the focus 
of the Dialectic is thus to see that the potential “division” Kant discusses in the Second 
Antinomy is, as we already hinted at above, a division which can only be conceptualized in 
terms of the potential distinctness of representations, the potential distinctness of its parts, 
etc. Because “division” can be seen as distinctness, and distinctness is a measure of the 
intensive degree of consciousness, there is a connection between Kant’s discussion of the 
categories of quality in the Analytic and that in the Dialectic. But again, this can only be 
properly understood once the essential role played by the intensive magnitude of 
consciousness is grasped.  
And that is what we must proceed to next. For in the B Paralogisms, the plot thickens. As of 
yet, we have seen only a somewhat strange displacement in what corresponds to the category 
of reality in the object. This changes when we encounter a new section written for the B 
Paralogisms, seemingly just a detour from the main objective of the Paralogisms, that is, the 
disclosure of the four paralogistic inferences associated with the groups of categories: the 
“Refutation of Mendelssohn's proof of the persistence of the soul” (B413-418). 
A short version of Mendelssohn’s proof (as Kant presents it) is something like the following: 
Given that the soul exists, there is no way in which it could disappear. Because it is simple, it 
cannot disintegrate, because it has no parts to split into. This seems clear, if one allows (as 
Kant does) that it is simple. Moreover, because of the properties of time, it cannot vanish. 
This is due to the fact that no amount of time is the smallest: If the soul was to vanish it 
would have to be there one moment, and gone the next. But this is impossible, there is no 
such thing as the “next” moment, just as there is no such thing as the “next” real number 
after 1. What Kant does is point to another way in which the soul could disappear: through 
elanguescence, i.e., through the gradual diminishing of its intensive magnitude down to 
nothing. An intensive magnitude is indicative of the fact that the category of reality is being 
applied. Kant says the following:  
Even if we allow the soul this simple nature (...), and hence no extensive magnitude, one nevertheless 
cannot deny to it, any more than to any other existence, an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of reality 
in regard to all its faculties, indeed to everything in general that constitutes its existence, which might 
diminish through all the infinitely many smaller degrees (B414).  
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In other words, Kant affirms that like everything that exists, the soul must have an intensive 
magnitude. 
First of all, I want to emphasize that this cannot be the unschematized category of reality, for 
the simple reason that ascribing to the soul an intensive magnitude means subsuming it under 
the schema of the categories of quality, i.e., the principle of intensive magnitude. From the 
unschematized category of reality one does not get so much as a hint that anything should 
have an intensive magnitude. Determining something as having an intensive magnitude just 
is subsuming it under the schematized categories of quality, just as determining something as 
having an extensive magnitude just is subsuming it under the schematized categories of 
quantity. As we have seen, Kant denies that the soul has an extensive magnitude, and thus he 
does not subsume it under the schematized categories of quantity. It is equally clear, 
however, that Kant affirms that the soul has an intensive magnitude, and thus he does 
subsume it under the schematized categories of quality.  
The major obstacle to an understanding of this claim is to grasp exactly what Kant intends to 
designate by the term “soul.” It is clear that it cannot be understood as an object, i.e., as 
substance, as this would go against the entire gist of the Paralogisms. It seems equally clear, 
however, that the “soul” in question here cannot be a merely logical subject, to which any of 
the categories can be applicable only in a transcendental sense.57 For as we have seen, it is 
the schematized version of the category of reality that is validly applied to the soul. What, 
then, does “soul” refer to in this context? Fortunately, we have already encountered this 
problem in the thesis: In our discussion of inner sense, we noted that inner sense provides 
“inner intuitions (of our souls)” (A34/B50). The question back then was what exactly inner 
sense could possibly tell us about ourselves, or our souls, since we could not intuit the soul 
itself, as an object. But now it seems that we can answer this question quite precisely: what 
inner sense can tell us about the soul is that it has an intensive magnitude. And this also 
clarifies the ambiguity concerning whether we intuit “ourselves” or our “inner state.” For 
“state” is merely another word for having certain properties at a certain time, and positive 
properties are exactly what is schematized under the category of reality. What this means is 
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that we only know “ourselves,” i.e., our “souls,” through our “state,” i.e., the intensive 
magnitude of consciousness. In other words, within Kant’s critical system, the terms 
“ourselves as we appear,” “the soul” (when not understood as object/substance) and “our 
inner state” all refer to the same thing: the intensive magnitude of consciousness.  
I would therefore argue that the Refutation of Mendelssohn’s Proof confirms the analysis 
presented in this thesis so far. For it is not a coincidence that when Kant appends a footnote 
to his point about the intensive magnitude of the soul, this footnote is the one that we have 
already analyzed in some detail in 3.1, i.e., the footnote about clear and obscure 
representations. The connection is quite striking, as these last three sentences bring out 
nicely:  
A representation is clear if the consciousness in it is sufficient for a consciousness of the difference 
between it and others. To be sure, if this consciousness suffices for a distinction, but not for a 
consciousness of the difference, then the representation must still be called obscure. So there are 
infinitely many degrees of consciousness down to its vanishing (B415n., italics mine). 
If it is correct to categorize obscure representations as those that have a low degree of clarity, 
the quote clearly seems to imply that the intensive magnitude of consciousness (of our souls) 
corresponds to the degree of clarity of our representations. In the Metaphysik Vigilantius 
from 1794-95, Kant distinguishes between the extensive magnitude of a thought in time (its 
duration) and the intensive magnitude (reality) of a “clear head”: “So a thought has, e.g., 
quantity as intuition in time, but a clear head has reality on account of the subjective 
sensations of its representations.”58 Kant’s reference to a “clear” head reinforces the 
interpretation presented here: the intensive magnitude of consciousness corresponds to the 
degree of clarity (the “subjective sensations”) of its representations. 59 
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 It would be desirable to work out how apperception fits into the account given here: 1) as a representation (what can we 
say about the “I” of apperception in respect to its clarity/obscurity?); and 2) in relation to reality (how can Kant say that 
“apperception is something real” (B419)?). But apperception in Kant is such a vast and difficult topic that such a working 
out would require a thesis of its own. All I can provide here, for the curious reader, is a few admittedly sketchy suggestions 
as to the lines along which such a working out could proceed: 
With regard to the first issue, the “I” of apperception is said to be simple. E.g.: “The simple and in content for itself wholly 
empty representation I, of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every 
concept” (A345-346/B404). Based on the account of clarity and distinctness given here, one must therefore question 
whether the “I” can be clear, since there seems to be no basis for a consciousness of the difference between the “I” and any 
other representation. This seems, strangely enough, to imply that this particular representation (of the “I”) has no degree of 
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I should already here emphasize that in addition to being a new theory of inner sense, the 
interpretation given also gainsays a quite widespread assumption about intensive 
magnitudes: that they are inescapably connected to the categories of relation. Such a view is 
exemplified by Daniel Warren, in Reality and Impenetrability in Kant’s Philosophy of 
Nature60 (see especially ch. 1), who claims that intensive magnitudes are causal powers. But 
it is difficult, to say the least, to see how the degree of clarity of a representation could be a 
causal power. It seems to me, then, that Warren’s view can be upheld only as long as one 
disregards or denies that consciousness has an intensive magnitude, or at least denies that 
this intensive magnitude is measured by the degree of clarity or obscurity of representations. 
The claim that consciousness has causal power is of course not philosophically unheard of 
                                                                                                                                           
clarity, i.e., no degree of consciousness. This may perhaps reflect the fact that the “I” is said to be “a mere consciousness” 
rather than to have a degree of consciousness.  
With regard to the second issue, we must be careful to denote precisely what we mean by “apperception.” The principle of 
synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., the principle that is encapsulated by Kant’s famous pronouncement “The I think must 
be able to accompany all my representations” (B131), is not a principle which demands clear self-consciousness. As one 
can gather from the quote, the principle states the necessary possibility of clear self-consciousness (i.e., the necessary 
possibility of the “I think”), rather than itself being a principle of clear self-consciousness. Thus Kant says that all my 
representations must “belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as 
such)” (B132). The “as such” I take to mean that we need not be aware that they are mine, i.e., they need not be clearly 
represented as mine. To be represented as mine, I take it, is to actually be accompanied by the “I think.,” that is, by clear 
self-consciousness. When it comes to the “I think” itself, as clear self-consciousness, the category of reality seems relevant. 
For Kant claims that this “I think,” as a given proposition, is empirical. E.g.: “the empirical but in regard to all kinds of 
intuition indeterminate proposition “I think”” (B421); “The “I think” is, as has already been said, an empirical proposition, 
and contains within itself the proposition “I exist”” (B422n.); and “The I think expresses the act of determining my 
existence. The existence is thereby already given” (B157n.). And there are several clues which link this empirical nature of 
the “I think” to reality: Kant says that the “I think” “expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., a perception (hence 
it proves that sensation, which consequently belongs to sensibility, grounds this existential proposition” (B422-423n.). If 
the indeterminate empirical intuition is indeed a perception then we would expect it to be covered by the Anticipations of 
Perception, where the principle for the categories of quality is said to hold for all perceptions. And when Kant goes on to 
specify, he indeed says: “An indeterminate perception here signifies only something real, which was given” (B423n., 
emphasis mine). Judging by this, it would seem that the “I think” is empirical in the sense that the schematized category of 
reality is applied to it. Now the problem is of course how to square this with Kant’s distinction between inner sense and 
apperception. The “I think” is related to apperception rather than inner sense, since he says about it: “The existence is 
thereby already given, but the way in which I am to determine it, i.e., the manifold that I am to posit in myself as belonging 
to it, is not yet thereby given. For that self-intuition is required” (B157n.). It is obvious from the context that inner sense is 
what can provide the required “self-intuition.” But if the point of inner sense is, as I have argued, to give us the intensive 
magnitude of consciousness, but the “I think” already has an intensive magnitude, then what is the difference? First of all, 
as I have already pointed out, one cannot simply identify the “I think” with apperception tout court, rather, the synthetic 
unity of apperception is the necessity of the possibility of the “I think.” I would suggest that the “I think” expresses the 
analytical unity of apperception, rather than the synthetic unity (for this distinction, see B133-134. Longuenesse also reads 
the “I think” as the analytic unity of apperception, see Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 67). The distinction 
between the synthetic unity of apperception and inner sense should therefore be unthreatened. Nevertheless, the “I think” 
must also be distinguished from inner sense. My best suggestion is that whereas the “I think” indeed seems to have an 
intensive magnitude, this intensive magnitude can be determined only through inner sense. In other words, the “thinking” 
that is predicated of the “I” indeed has an intensive magnitude, but this intensive magnitude is determined only by the self-
affection of inner sense providing the empirical content of the thought. In fact, in light of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism it 
turns out that not only does this kind of determination require inner sense, but it also presupposes outer experience. I say 
more about this in chapters 4.2-4.4. 
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(Kant’s attitude toward this claim is far from simple), but the claim that the degree of 
consciousness met with in a representation, i.e., its degree of clarity or obscurity, is a causal 
power, hardly seems plausible.61  
Being clear about this distinction between intensive magnitudes and causal powers seem to 
me to have the side benefit of allowing us to avoid a conflation: namely, between the 
category of reality and the modal category of existence (actuality). When applied to our 
sensible conditions, the modal category claims actuality [Wirklichkeit] for that which accords 
with the formal conditions of experience and is connected with the material condition of 
experience, i.e., sensation. This connection to the material conditions of experience, Kant 
states, is made by means of the analogies of experience, i.e., by the categories of relation (see 
A225/B272). Now all “sensible” realities, that is, reality as that which “corresponds to the 
sensation” (A168/B209), are intensive magnitudes. Now since these realities already 
correspond to sensation, then if they are all causal powers as well, they are obviously 
connected by means of the second and third analogy of experience, and thus they must be 
actual. But if this follows from the principle of intensive magnitude itself, then there is no 
need for a separate principle of actuality. Warren in fact emphasizes the difference between 
the category of actuality and the category of reality (see p. 3), but what he fails to do, as far 
as I can see, is to consider whether there can be any difference between the schematized 
versions of these categories on his account. When Warren states that these categories are 
different because we can represent concepts as having positive properties (realities) without 
claiming that the concepts are actually instantiated (in an existing object), he seems to be 
comparing the “intellectual” category of reality with the “sensible” category of actuality; it is 
not surprising that these are different.62 What should be in question is whether reality as that 
which corresponds to sensation can be distinguished from actuality. It is not clear to me that 
Warren’s account is able to make that distinction. My interpretation avoids this problem by 
claiming that not all realities are causal powers.  
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 The distinction between “intellectual” and “sensible” categories is Warren’s, see Warren, Reality and Impenetrability in 
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But my view also conflicts with those less radical views that stop short of postulating 
intensive magnitudes tout court as causal powers, while nonetheless affirming some 
indispensable connection with the categories of relation. For instance, in Longuenesse’s 
interpretation of the Principles, she writes: “Finally, if the category of reality reflects, not 
sensation simpliciter, but sensation related to an object, or the matter of appearance as “that 
which corresponds to sensation,” the category of reality (Realität) cannot be considered apart 
from the categories of relation”63 And, after referring to the mathematical/dynamical 
distinction, she continues:  
He [Kant] has stressed that the former have to do with the constitution of our (pure or empirical) 
intuitions, while the latter alone have to do with the existence of the objects represented in our 
intuitions. But in the proof of the Anticipations of Perception he relates “the real of sensation” to 
“something existing in space or time” ([Longuenesse’s] emphasis)64  
But it must now be pointed out that Kant has a concept of existence distinct from the 
categorial one, as explicitly noted in the B Paralogisms in connection with the “I think” that 
we have already discussed. Kant here says about the “I think”: “It expresses an indeterminate 
empirical intuition, i.e., a perception (…), but it precedes the experience that is to determine 
the object of perception through the category in regard to time; and here existence is not yet a 
category” (B422-423n.). It seems clear that in this case at least, perception implies existence 
of a non-categorial kind, precisely because it is not yet determined “through the category in 
regard to time,” i.e., through the categories of relation, as “rules of general time-
determination” (A177-178/B220). Now insofar as we take the Anticipations to guarantee that 
empirical realities, “the real of appearance,” has an intensive magnitude, without determining 
anything about what the intensive magnitude must be, we would expect the situation there to 
be similar to that of the B422-423 footnote. And indeed, the footnote has many textual 
parallels to the Anticipations: he is concerned with the perception of an “indeterminately 
given object” (B423n.), similar to the “object in general” (B207) of the Anticipations. Both 
contain references to “sensation,” and the reference to “object[s] of perception” (B207, 
B423n.) in both cases makes the parallel even clearer. Accordingly, there are reasonable 
grounds for subsuming the reference to “existing” in the Anticipations to the notion of 
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existence given in the B422-423 footnote, as an indeterminate sense of existence, prior to the 
determination of the “way of existing” (B410) which can only be made by way of the 
dynamical categories, specifically the categories of relation. And it is precisely this non-
categorial concept of existence, which is correlated with reality instead of actuality, that 
allows Kant to avoid the conflation between actuality and reality. It should also be noted, in 
this regard, that in Longuenesse’s quote Kant says “existing in space or time” (my 
emphasis), thus explicitly referring to the fact that while everything that exists does so in 
time, not everything is in space. Consciousness, while certainly existing, does not exist in 
space.  
As I hope that the current chapter has showed, it is indeed necessary, pace Longuenesse, to 
consider the category of reality independently of the categories of relation. Indeed, on the 
interpretation given here, the parallels invoked above are natural, since Kant has been, in the 
B Paralogisms, trying to convey that consciousness must necessarily have an intensive 
magnitude. The fact that intensive magnitudes in general should have the same kind of 
existence as the intensive magnitude of consciousness is therefore no big surprise.65  
What are the results of our investigation so far? The main achievement is the outlines of a 
new interpretation of inner sense: Whereas outer sense is what provides us with the material, 
that is to say, the representations themselves, inner sense is what gives us the state of the 
representations. And this state is a degree of clarity, which, as a sum total over all our 
representations, constitutes our “inner state”: the intensive magnitude of consciousness.  
By means of this result, we have also already begun developing the second main topic of the 
thesis; namely, the categories of quality and the concomitant principle of intensive 
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 It would be worthwhile to reinvestigate the relation between reality and actuality, and in general the relation between the 
categories of quality and those of modality, on the basis of the reappraisal of inner sense that I have set out here. As I have 
tried to show, the intensive magnitude of consciousness seems to present us, through inner sense, with a clear case of 
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(A222/B269). For it is noticeable that these concepts pertain to each of the categories of relation (substance, causality, 
community), and the examples of new concepts Kant gives are all constructed by giving inner sense a role that it is not, in 
our present experience, able to fulfil (for example the thought of “a faculty of our mind to stand in a community of thoughts 
with other men” (A222/B270), which seems to be constructed by applying the result of the Third Analogy to the content of 
inner sense). This is one of the clear examples of passages where a better understanding of the specificities inherent to each 
of Kant’s forms (of intuition and of thought) is needed in order to grasp Kant’s meaning. But constructing a framework for 
making these connections intelligible would constitute a major undertaking, and cannot be attempted here.  
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magnitude. As we have seen, the interpretation of inner sense given here provides meaning 
and content to Kant’s clear distinction between intensive magnitudes (realities) and causal 
powers, as well as the modal category of actuality. This is in fact an important preliminary 
result, since much of the commentary on the categories of quality and their principle has, as 
exemplified above, proceeded exactly by denying that they can be explicated independently 
of the dynamical categories. 
I have, as of yet, not said much about self-affection. Since the idea of self-affection seems to 
be central to Kant’s discussion of inner sense, it is an appropriate test of my interpretation 
whether it can provide a plausible and coherent explication of self-affection, as it is 
presented in the Critique. The next two chapters, 4.1 and 4.2, will deal with this topic. First I 
will address the meaning of the concept of an “act of attention.” 
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4. Self-Affection 
4.1 Attention 
In dealing with Kant’s theory of self-affection, the concept of attention is often brought to the 
foreground. The reason for this is that the act of attention is used as an example – as a matter 
of fact, the only explicit example – of self-affection in the B Deduction. In a footnote 
appended to §24, where Kant introduces self-affection in the B Deduction, he says as 
follows: 
I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected by ourselves. 
Every act of attention can give us an example of this. In such acts the understanding always 
determines the inner sense, in accordance with the combination that it thinks, to the inner intuition that 
corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is commonly 
affected by this means, everyone will be able to perceive in himself. (B156-157n.)  
Since I have now presented the outlines of my own interpretation of inner sense, attention 
seems a suitable test case by which to measure my suggestion against others in the literature. 
The examples that I will draw on explicitly are those of Allison, and a more recent 
interpretation forwarded by Dyck, in his article “Empirical Consciousness Explained: Self-
Affection, (Self-)Consciousness and Perception in the B Deduction.”66 To anticipate the 
results of this chapter, I believe that the account of attention given by my interpretation 
compares favourably to the others; more specifically, I will argue that my interpretation fits 
better with: (1) our intuitive or phenomenological notion of what attention is; (2) what Kant 
says about attention in his other works; and (3) what Kant says about attention in the B156-
157 footnote. I will go through these points in order. But first of all, let us quickly summarize 
the interpretations of attention given by Allison and Dyck. Allison’s view is, as we have 
seen, premised upon the distinction between two kinds of self-affection. Attention constitutes 
the second act of self-affection, which Allison sees as providing for specifically inner 
experience. In attending to a representation, we re-conceptualize it as an object, and thereby 
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grasp this representation as belonging to us: “In attending to its representations, the mind 
makes them into objects perceived.”67 Thus, attention is separated from and presupposes the 
transcendental synthesis of the imagination. Dyck’s interpretation, in sharp contrast to 
Allison’s, actually identifies attention with the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. 
He claims that Kant “is directly identifying the act of attention with the transcendental 
synthesis of the imagination,” and that “it is through the act of attention that the subject 
affects itself.”68 As different as these two interpretations are, they agree on one thing: They 
both put the act of attention at the centre of an understanding of self-affection and self-
knowledge. In other words, both identify attention with self-affection,69 and differ only in the 
position that they jointly give to these two notions.70 Let us now proceed to the points raised 
earlier.  
(1): How would a phenomenological description of what we consider as acts of attention 
look like? First, let us consider how the other interpretations cohere with our everyday view 
of attention. Take the following sentence: “Pay attention to the road.” It would be strange 
(and potentially dangerous) to take this to mean, as Allison’s interpretation would suggest, 
that you should re-conceptualize your representation of the road as a subjective object, in 
order to see this representation as belonging to you. But Dyck’s interpretation fares no better; 
it would suggest that the imperative sentence simply means to synthesize the representation 
of the road into a spatiotemporal part of your experience, something you can hardly avoid 
doing as long as the road is in your visual field. Similarly, paying attention to a sound would, 
                                              
67
 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 284. 
68
 Dyck, “Empirical Consciousness Explained: Self-Affection, (Self-)Consciousness and Perception in the B Deduction,” 
41. 
69
 In Allison’s case, he identifies attention with the second kind of self-affection, the kind leading to inner experience.  
70
 Insofar as Valaris regards self-affection as something provided exclusively by the transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination, and accepts the act of attention as an example of self-affection (as he should, considering that the footnote 
explicitly says that attention is an example of self-affection), his position seems to be close to Dyck’s. Though it is perhaps 
open for him to argue that acts of attention form only a subset of the acts of transcendental synthesis of the imagination. 
Something like this “subset” view might also be the position of Béatrice Longuenesse, who says: “Similarly, ‘making the 
empirical intuition of [a house] into a perception’ means subjecting the immediate sensible given (the intuition of the house 
as a quantum) to the act of attention by which it can also eventually be measured. With this act, ‘I draw as it were the 
outline of the house’ just as in the earlier example I drew the line or the circle.” (Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to 
Judge, 271, emphasis mine). This suggests that attention is specifically entangled in the transcendental synthesis of 
apprehension.  
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on Dyck’s proposal, be something you can only avoid by not actually hearing the sound in 
question – hearing it is already paying attention to it, on his account.  
Now, before evaluating these objections one may ask: Is it not reasonable to think that Kant, 
in the B Deduction footnote, is pointing to something different from our intuitive notion? 
That he is rather making a transcendental point about a function of attention that must be 
seen as grounding our ordinary, empirical acts of attention, and therefore that our intuitive, 
phenomenological notion of what attention is cannot be used as an argument? In my view, 
there are several reasons for thinking that this is erroneous, and that he is indeed talking 
about the ordinary concept of attention. First of all, we should try to avoid attributing any 
more obscurity to Kant than necessary. Kant was perfectly capable of adding 
“transcendental” whenever a word should be taken in a different significance than the 
ordinary, i.e., transcendental imagination, transcendental subject, motion considered 
transcendentally, transcendental matter, etc. There is no hint of this when it comes to 
attention, either in the footnote or anywhere else.  
Secondly, taking Kant to be referring to some kind of “transcendental attention” contradicts 
what seems on the face of it to be the main point of the footnote. For in the footnote, he is 
pointing to our everyday experiences of acts of attention as giving an example of self-
affection; if he was talking about some esoteric, transcendental notion of attention it would 
make no sense to say that “I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that 
inner sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention can give us an example of this,” 
and further, “how much the mind is commonly affected by this means, everyone will be able 
to perceive in himself” (B156-157n.).71  
Finally, I believe that my own interpretation of inner sense allows us to understand attention 
in a way that coheres well with our intuitive notion, as well as with what Kant says in other 
passages, as we shall see. For as I have previously expounded, inner sense gives the degree 
of clarity of our representations. Self-affection, insofar as it is what determines inner sense, 
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should therefore relate to this. My interpretation thus suggests that if attention is an example 
of self-affection, this is because it modifies the degrees of clarity of our representations. And 
indeed, the intuitive notion of “paying attention to the road” has to do with the degree of 
clarity of the representation of the road: it is something like “continually making and keeping 
the representation of the road a clear and distinct one.” If the intuitive notion is to be taken 
into account, then, it appears that the interpretation given here has a definite advantage.  
(2): This appearance is strengthened when one considers the passages from outside the 
Critique where Kant explicitly discusses attention. In his metaphysics lectures, Kant says the 
following: “Abstraction is the actualization of attention, whereby only a single representation 
is made clear and all the remaining are obscured. Attention does not stop with abstraction, 
but rather it is only directed from one or several objects to one, and all the remaining 
representations obscured and the one clear.”72 As is clear from the quote, Kant himself 
connects attention to a modification of the degree of clarity of representations. But moreover, 
I will argue, the quote also suggests that attention is not (or at least not solely) an aspect of 
the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. The acts of abstraction that attention is 
intimately related to here73 are according to Kant of a piece with acts of comparison and 
reflection as the three basic logical acts, that is to say, they are kinds of intellectual synthesis 
rather than figurative synthesis. They are acts for generating and refining concepts rather than 
intuitions. An example from the Jäsche Logic brings this point out nicely: “Abstraction is 
only the negative condition under which universal representations [concepts] can be 
generated, the positive condition is comparison and reflection. For no concept comes to be 
through abstraction; abstraction only perfects it and encloses it in its determinate limits.”74 
This is equally troublesome for Allison and Dyck, since they both assign attention as a 
function of the imagination rather than the understanding. Of course, from what has been 
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said so far it cannot be ruled out that attention has a dual signification, one logical and the 
other sensible.  
(3): If we look closely at the footnote from the Critique, however, this is not what Kant 
seems to suggest. What he says, rather, is that “in such acts the understanding always 
determines the inner sense” (B157n., emphasis mine). And lest we believe that this is a 
reference to the “effect of the understanding on sensibility” (B152), which is associated with 
the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, Kant adds that inner sense is determined 
according to the combination that understanding thinks “in the synthesis of the 
understanding” (B157n.), in other words, in the intellectual synthesis. And it should not in 
itself be that hard to agree that paying attention to something is in many cases a consciously 
decided act, whereas the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, insofar as it is the 
synthesis through which the fact that the categories hold of all possible experience is 
grounded, is not something we consciously decide to apply. Nonetheless, there has obviously 
been a real difficulty in taking this passage literally, presumably because it seems to brazenly 
cross Kant’s receptivity/spontaneity divide. In any case, I believe that there is a case to be 
made for taking Kant at his word here. Indeed, Kant’s point seems to be that it is more 
obvious that we are affected by ourselves through intellectual synthesis than through 
figurative synthesis. How can we understand this?  
Let me suggest, then, that Kant’s intention might have been something like the following: To 
justify the claim that self-affection is the ground of every possible experience we can have of 
ourselves, he needs to show that the understanding’s “first application (and at the same time 
the ground of all others) to objects of the intuition” (B152) is a self-affection. In other words, 
what he wants to dispute is the following picture: It is granted that we are receptive creatures 
that depend on outer affection. Once this material has arrived, however, in our active 
apprehension of this material, we intuit ourselves as we are, and not merely as we appear. 
According to Locke, for example, inner sense is reflective; sensibility takes the form of a 
mirror. In other words, there is no mediation, but rather, our acts of thought are immediately 
and directly sensed – i.e., there is no distinction between inner sense and apperception. 
Similarly, the monads are not “creative intellects” in the sense that they themselves create 
what they perceive (God being the exception to this, of course). But their apperception is still 
also a direct apprehension of the content of their states, and therefore, inner sense and 
apperception are conflated. When Kant describes the problem in terms of understanding how 
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it could be that “we would have to relate to ourselves passively” (B153), the passivity 
implies more than simply a receptivity that imposes no conditions of its own, but instead 
directly receives what the mind actively thinks. If this were the case, there would be no sense 
in speaking of “passivity,” since the apprehension of its own activity might just as well be 
seen as an aspect of the activity. In other words, there is a reason Kant does not distinguish 
explicitly between the “intuiting” and the “intuition,”75 whereas he does make a point of 
distinguishing between inner sense and apperception. And the reason is that even though for 
intuition one can indeed distinguish between the active (act of intuiting) and passive (the 
intuition as product, as mental content) aspect, no vital difference is thereby pinpointed. The 
intuition that you intuit has no further conditions beyond the conditions for intuiting the 
intuition. When it comes to inner sense and apperception, however, things are different. Inner 
sense provides a further condition for intuiting apperception, beyond what is necessary for 
apperception itself.76  
This is why the question which looms the largest is: how is the mind passive in perceiving 
what seems to be its most passive aspect, namely intuition? Intuiting seems to be something 
the mind immediately perceives itself as doing. It is therefore in transcendental imagination, 
where apperception is involved, but seemingly without requiring any extra condition to be 
perceived, that the question of self-affection is most pressing. If we consider this in light of 
the qualia debate, things become considerably clearer. Kant’s point, then, is that even our 
sensory impressions, even those qualia that seem to be immediately and unmistakeably given 
as the content of our minds, are the result of self-affection, and therefore only show ourselves 
as we appear. When we return to consider sensation later in this thesis (chapter 5.2), we can 
perhaps evaluate this suggestion more precisely.  
In any case, it seems clear that the interpretation proposed in this thesis is better suited to 
accommodate what Kant says in the footnote than those of Allison and Dyck. For none of 
their interpretations seem equipped to account for a connection between intellectual 
syntheses and inner sense. If, on the other hand, we interpret inner sense on the basis of 
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Kant’s doctrine of the intensive magnitude of consciousness, then we are already committed 
to claiming that there is a connection between intellectual representations (a concept) and 
intensive magnitude (the degree of clarity of the concept); and thereby also between logical 
acts (like the logical act of attention) and inner sense (the logical act of attention modifies the 
degree of clarity of representations). But how, exactly, should we understand attention as a 
“synthesis of the understanding”?  
Insofar as an act of attention succeeds in making one representation sufficiently clear, the 
result is that this representation can be reflected in a concept, by means of judgment. For 
example, an act of attention can result in the following (overt or tacit) judgments: “Oh, it is a 
horse,” or “A rock is blocking the way.” This, I suggest, is what Kant means when he says 
that the “synthesis of the understanding” determines the inner intuition. For by bringing the 
representation to clarity one is able to reflect the representation in a concept, and thereby the 
inner intuition is conceptually determined.   
This does not apply only to perceptual judgments, but equally to conceptual judgments. In 
other words, attention “determines inner sense” when it modifies the logical clarity of our 
representations, just as much as when it modifies the aesthetic clarity. Any analytic 
judgment, for instance, requires the ability to clearly represent what is analytically contained 
in the concept. In the Blomberg Logic of the early 1770s, Kant notes that: “All distinguishing 
of the true from the false involves the cognition of inner sense[,] i.e., I must be and become 
conscious what really lies in my concept, and what I think.”77 Kant clearly seems to suggest 
here that analytic judgments (insofar as “what really lies in my concept” is normally a 
reference to what is analytically contained in the concept) depend upon the “cognition of 
inner sense.”  In other words, both aesthetic and conceptual representations have their degree 
of clarity through inner sense, but a determination of these representations, i.e., a judgment 
having a truth value, can only be obtained through an act of attention whereby one attempts 
to bring clarity to the representations and determine them in judgments. And this is also 
where the possibility of error arises. Kant continues: “Inner sense is often dull, and its 
horizon shrouded in fog, and it does not give us enough help. Meanwhile, though, inner 
sense also belongs to sensibility, but without it the understanding cannot judge, so the 
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understanding must judge with the help of sensibility[;] and just this connection and mixing 
together of the understanding with sensibility is the source of all errors, namely, the effects of 
the understanding are taken for effects of sensibility.”78 When making a judgment, you must 
base this judgment upon representations with a degree of clarity, whether aesthetic or logical 
(Aesthetic: paying attention to the aesthetic features of the figure in the field, I form the 
judgment “It is a horse.” Logical: paying attention to what lies in the concept “matter,” I 
form the judgment “Matter is lifeless”), but this judgment can always turn out to have been 
mistaken (Aesthetic: on approaching, you see that it is actually two men wearing a horse 
costume. Logical: on closer investigation, the empirical concept of matter does not 
analytically contain “lifelessness”79). Kant describes this by saying that “we take merely 
subjective grounds to be objective,”80 meaning that we take the subjective representation, as 
it is accompanied by a degree of clarity, to be objective.  
In other words, the possibility of error arises because we have a point of view, as disclosed in 
inner sense, and we sometimes mistakenly judge our own subjective point of view to 
correspond to the objective features of the world. My interpretation, which takes this 
subjective point of view to be the degree of clarity of our representations, allows us to 
understand how error in analytic as well as synthetic judgments can arise from taking these 
subjective grounds (the representations with the degree of clarity we are able to give them) to 
be objective (the true features of the objects or concepts).  
I have already begun referencing the “further condition” that inner sense imposes. But it is 
now time to re-introduce the form that this condition takes, i.e., that the form of inner sense 
is time. It remains to be seen how well the interpretation proposed here can combine the two 
following claims: 1) that time is the form of inner sense, and 2) that the degree of clarity of 
representations is the determination of inner sense. As is well known, monads are not 
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primarily in time. It is therefore imperative, insofar as we have played up the similarity 
between the Kantian inner sense and the inner state of the monad, to explain how time, as an 
essential component of cognition and an unavoidable form of intuition, enters the picture. In 
the following section, we will investigate the relationship between time and inner sense, 
through the concept, propounded in the B Deduction, of transcendental motion. 
4.2 Consciousness in Motion 
So far, I have tried to present a novel interpretation of the dependence of the inner manifold 
on the outer manifold – what this means, and how it can tell us anything about ourselves. To 
review, the inner manifold consists in the degree of consciousness of the outer 
representations (or concepts that ultimately depend upon these outer representations). And 
the reason this potentially tells us something about ourselves is that it is not a simple 
reflection of the outer content, but the degree of consciousness is precisely the degree to 
which our consciousness actively apprehends the outer content.  
What we have not yet clarified, however, is how this inner sense is connected to time. Time 
is, as we have seen, the form of inner sense, and it is therefore incumbent upon an 
interpretation of inner sense to explain how this is so and what it means. In the present case, 
that means answering the following questions: How is the clarity and distinctness of 
representations connected to time? What is the connection between the degree of 
consciousness, and the “time in which we place these representations” (B67)? In the 
remainder of this chapter I will interpret this connection, by looking at the concept of motion 
in Kant, and more specifically, as it is presented in the B Deduction, where Kant 
distinguishes between two kinds of motion. What I will attempt is to explain how one of 
these kinds of motion, motion as action of the subject or “description of a space” (B155n.), 
can be understood precisely as a way of understanding the connection between time and 
degree of consciousness. This will then constitute the first part of the full explanation of the 
role of time in the part of Kant’s framework interpreted here. The rest of the story, 
elucidating the meaning of Kant’s claim that time is the immediate condition of inner 
intuitions, the mediate condition of outer appearances, will be given in the following 
chapters of the thesis.  
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Let me first of all situate the remarks about motion in the context of the B Deduction, and 
then present two opposing interpretations of the specific concept of motion relevant in the 
Deduction – what I will term transcendental motion.  
This motion is, by Kant, also referred to as “motion, as action of the subject (not as 
determination of an object)” (B155). Implied by this is a distinction between two kinds of 
motion, and in a footnote Kant expands on this:  
Motion of an object in space does not belong in a pure science, thus also not in geometry; for that 
something is movable cannot be cognized a priori but only through experience. But motion, as 
description of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer imagination in 
general through productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry but even to transcendental 
philosophy. (B155n.) 
A reasonable assumption, on the basis of this footnote, is that Kant distinguishes between the 
kind of motion relevant to empirical science – the kind which comes to the fore in the 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science – from the purely critical concept relevant to 
the Deduction and to transcendental philosophy. However, since this distinction has been 
downplayed, prominently by Michael Friedman in Kant and the Exact Sciences, we should 
look more into the details.81 Specifically, Friedman seems to identify or at least bring closely 
together the motion “as description of a space” with the kind of motion described in the first 
chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations, namely, phoronomical motion, i.e., the motion of a 
mathematical point.82 As support for this interpretation, Friedman adduces the following 
passage from the Phoronomy chapter: 
In phoronomy, since I am acquainted with matter through no other property but its movability, and may 
thus consider it only as a point, motion can only be considered as the describing of a space – in such a 
way, however, that I attend not solely, as in geometry, to the space described, but also to the time in 
which, and thus to the speed with which, a point describes the space.83 
As we can see, the phrase “description of a space” occurs both in the Deduction and the 
Phoronomy, and can therefore be seen to point in favour of Friedman’s hypothesis. However, 
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there is other textual evidence that weighs against it: For one thing, in the B155 footnote 
Kant specifies that movability is an empirical notion, pertaining to the motion of objects 
rather than the motion of the subject relevant to the Deduction. Since Kant in the Phoronomy 
explicitly states that we are acquainted with matter “through no other property but its 
movability,” this indicates that the Phoronomy deals with empirical matter, and therefore not 
with transcendental philosophy proper. And indeed, the reference to the motion of “matter” 
should in itself be enough to conclude that he sees this as the motion of an object rather than 
motion, as action of a subject. On a more general note, it is also clear that Kant wants to keep 
separate the purely a priori investigations of the Critique from the pure part of natural 
science presented in the Metaphysical Foundations; i.e. keep the transcendental philosophy 
of the Critique distinct from the metaphysics of corporeal nature of the Metaphysical 
Foundations.84 Only after emphasizing this distinction does Kant go on to introduce the 
guiding concept of the foundation of natural science: “The basic determination of something 
that is to be an object of the outer senses had to be motion, because only thereby can these 
senses be affected.”85 There are many signs, therefore, that we would be conflating things 
Kant wants to keep separate if we identified motion, as action of the subject, with 
phoronomical motion. And of course, the fact that both are referred to as “the description of 
a space” does not by itself tell us that they should be identified – presumably, the motion of 
an object (a mathematical point) and motion, as action of the subject, can both be 
descriptions of space without being the same description. There is, however, another 
underlying issue that I believe motivates Friedman’s interpretation. Namely, insofar as 
change is dealt with in the Analogies of the Critique and its real possibility therefore 
proscribed a priori, how can movability be considered as empirical?86 These two concepts 
seem as if they should be on exactly the same footing, enjoy the same status. However, on 
this point I am in agreement with Walker that motion is in fact empirical whereas change, as 
such, is not. 87 Quite simply, change (even in space) does not a priori imply motion. The fact 
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that our senses can only be affected by moving forces should not be considered a priori, any 
more than our particular sensory modalities (sight, hearing, etc.) should. And this is because 
change can also be change in quality, or change in intensity, and such changes could, if our 
sensory organs were different, have affected us directly.88  
This point also indicates my disagreement with a different reading of transcendental motion, 
that of Jens Saugstad, in his article “Kant on Action and Knowledge.”89 On his externalist 
reading, the motion specified in the Deduction is an action of the subject simply because it is 
the overt action of an agent. The “overtness” of this action, the part that makes Saugstad’s 
proposal externalist, is the reference to “actions essentially involving the movement of the 
limbs.”90 But while it is true that this kind of motion, as opposed to that of other objects in 
space, “is part of an action performed by a human agent,”91 the problem is that it is exactly 
this part – the external, bodily part – that Kant would assign to the a posteriori “motion of an 
object in space.” And for good reason, if the movability of objects in general can only be 
empirically ascertained. For his case against a priori movable bodies in general should then 
also count as a case against a priori movable bodies in the case of our own human body.  
This is not to deny that the empirical actions exemplifying what Kant is here talking about – 
drawing a line, etc. – are more often than not overt actions of an agent. The importance of the 
use of diagrams in Kant’s philosophy of mathematics, for example, should certainly not be 
underestimated. The point is rather that the part of this exemplification that Kant denotes 
under the term “motion, as description of a space” (B155n.) is not the part of it concerned 
with the motion of the limbs, even if those limbs belong to a human agent.92 I hope to 
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present an interpretation here that involves an “internalization” of transcendental motion, 
while nonetheless making it perfectly obvious that such a motion is a presupposition of every 
possible human experience. To anticipate, I view transcendental motion and the fact that our 
representations always have a degree of clarity as mutually entailing each other. Since having 
a degree of clarity and distinctness seems like an undeniable fact about Kantian 
representations, I hope that this can serve to demystify transcendental motion all the while 
resisting an externalist interpretation, whether in terms of the motion of a point or in terms of 
the overt action of an agent.  
So, if we distinguish the transcendental motion from every kind of motion of an object, even 
that of a mathematical point (as in Friedman) or that of the limbs of a human agent (as in 
Saugstad), what are we left with?93 The clue Kant gives us is the notion of the “description 
of a space.” This kind of description is then also identified with self-affection. I believe that 
the generic term “description” is in fact better suitable to conveying Kant’s meaning than the 
specific examples that he goes on to illustrate his point with. For in general, a description 
involves specifying what one is describing, that is to say, finding distinctions or 
determinations that can pick out what is described from the “background.” In terms of the 
vocabulary used in this thesis, to describe something means to provide its representation with 
a degree of clarity. And as I’ve said earlier (in chapter 3.1), there must be a connection 
between aesthetic clarity and logical clarity: If we are to form an empirical concept, our 
empirical intuition must already contain, as aesthetic features, the distinguishing marks of the 
concept. And the role of “motion, as an action of the subject” is to describe the sensible by 
making pre-conceptual distinctions in what is given as an indeterminate whole of intuition. 
We can note, first of all, that this motion is necessary for experience: Without sensible 
distinctions we cannot even identify objects. But moreover, it is equally obvious that our 
                                                                                                                                           
Foundations, transcendental rules in the case of Saugstad’s reading of the Critique). But in both cases a very general 
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human understanding is incapable of reaching the level of clarity Leibniz affirms of God; 
that is, completely clear and distinct representations. One could even claim that for Kant, 
such completeness is impossible for any creature with space and time as forms of intuition – 
since it would amount to a complete division, of the kind Kant proves to be impossible in the 
Second Antinomy.  
We thus see that the two options considered here end up as no understanding, in the first 
case, and the impossible infinite understanding, in the other. In between those extremes we 
find ourselves: as finite understandings with the capacity for transcendental motion. In other 
words, to describe a space means to determine the manifold of that space with a certain 
degree of clarity and distinctness, by describing some of its properties. This process of 
description is ongoing and finite, meaning that the idea of a total, complete description is not 
actually attainable. That is to say that we know this description as successive, i.e., as 
constrained by the form of intuition known as time. The distinction between what is 
described (in space) and the describing (in time) can then be cashed out in terms of the 
distinction between the outer representation and the degree of consciousness attached to that 
representation. Thus, when Kant says:  
Motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an object), consequently the synthesis of the 
manifold in space, if we abstract from this manifold in space and attend solely to the action in 
accordance with which we determine the form of inner sense, first produces the concept of succession 
(B155). 
He is saying that if we focus on the describing we find that what is determined are successive 
states, each of which constitute a specific, and limited (not infinite) degree of consciousness. 
This image, and its connection with the categories of quality, is reflected by a passage in the 
Metaphysik Vigilantius: “Limitation, i.e., the representation of a thing, whose being is 
affected by its non-being, therefore whose concept contains a being and non-being 
connected. E.g., light is reality; darkness is negation; shadow is limitation, for it is a darkness 
which is bounded by light. So also cognition - ignorance - limited knowledge.”94 In other 
words, what holds for consciousness in general (that it always has a limited degree of 
reality), is here said to hold also for the more specific mental state of cognition; it is part of 
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the human condition to have a limited knowledge, a degree. This condition should be seen as 
part of what Kant is referring to by calling inner sense a “limiting condition” (B159).  
We should at this point be able to dispense with some of the common criticisms directed at 
Kant’s theory of the determination of inner sense. For in his examples, Kant seems to suggest 
that we can only ever intuit something by a continuous motion through all its parts. But it 
seems like a basic phenomenological fact that we sometimes take things in “at a glance.” If 
we can, for instance, perceive a line simply by a glance, does this not contradict Kant’s 
statement that we have to draw the line in order to think it? Perhaps this objection highlights 
the inadequacy of Kant’s examples.95 From the interpretation given here, it should be clear 
that Kant should not be taken as relying upon a view in which a figure must be apprehended 
by starting from its first point and moving continuously through each subsequent point in 
linear fashion, thereby supporting the transcendental synthesis of the imagination upon a 
rather unconvincing internal analogy to drawing. Rather, what happens is that we go through 
a continuous motion in going from no perception of a line to a clear perception of a line. This 
motion will only in special cases be something similar to “drawing” the line from one end to 
the other. Unfortunately, Kant uses an example which diverts our attention to the extensive 
magnitude when his point is really about intensive magnitude; his real point does not concern 
the spatial line (Kant himself points out that we should “abstract from this manifold in 
space” and “attend solely to the action”), but rather the self-affection involved in making a 
sensible distinction, in the form of a line. This self-affection results in the generation of an 
intensive magnitude (a degree of clarity) rather than an extensive magnitude (a line). 
According to Kant, we are not building intuitions from “sensory atoms,” but rather 
introducing distinctions into an indeterminate whole of intuition. The process involved in the 
motion, as action of a subject, is therefore a “drawing” in the following sense: “But it [the 
sensation] is understood as a magnitude whereby the parts are not cognized previously in 
order to determine the magnitude, rather they must be cognized as unity, and the parts drawn 
out from the unity.”96 And since the time in which this process takes place is continuous, the 
change in the degree of clarity of any representation must also be continuous (or more 
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precisely put, we can never ascertain a discontinuous leap from a degree of clarity to another, 
since this would amount to claiming that the degree changed from one moment to the next, 
but since time is continuous there is no such thing as a “next” moment).97 
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5. Inner Sense and Intensity 
5.1 Intensive Magnitudes 
In the previous discussion of the intensive magnitude of consciousness, we noted that Kant’s 
conclusion was: “So there are infinitely many degrees of consciousness down to its 
vanishing” (B415n.). But the question we must now ask ourselves is: why are there infinitely 
many degrees? This question can be generalized as a problem that has puzzled all 
commentators trying to make sense of Kant’s principle of intensive magnitude: How can 
Kant prove a priori that every sensation, and every reality corresponding to it, is an 
intensive, continuous magnitude? Why is it not possible that at least some sensations are 
either there or not there, or that their magnitude change in discrete jumps, or even that a 
sensation could simply be there without admitting of any quantitative change at all?98 In the 
next paragraph I will give an outline of the problem, pointing to the reasons it has proven so 
difficult to solve. 
One of the distinctions made at the very beginning of the Transcendental Aesthetic is that 
between the matter of appearance and the form of appearance. Kant describes the distinction 
as follows: “I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter, but that 
which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call 
the form of appearance” (A20/B34). He proceeds to claim that “the matter of all appearance 
is only given to us a posteriori” (A20/B34). As is well known, the focus of Kant’s 
investigation is a type of judgment hitherto unknown to philosophers, but which Kant will 
bring to the centre stage, namely the synthetic a priori judgment: “The real problem of pure 
reason is now contained in the question: How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?” 
(B19) Since the matter of appearance can only be given to us a posteriori, we might draw the 
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conclusion that we will not be occupied with it in the following, and that we will not be able 
to judge synthetically a priori concerning it. For instance, in the “Transition to the 
transcendental deduction of the categories,” Kant states that representation and object relate 
only “Either if the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the representation 
alone makes the object possible. If it is the first, then this relation is only empirical, and the 
representation is never possible a priori. And this is the case with appearance in respect of 
that in it which belongs to sensation” (A92/B125). Thus, such a conclusion seems to be 
borne out, until we reach the Schematism of the Analytic. At that point, the matter of 
appearance returns, and surprisingly, here Kant seems to allow for synthetic a priori 
judgments about it after all. He introduces the topic with the following comment: “Reality is 
in the pure concept of the understanding that to which a sensation in general corresponds, 
that, therefore, the concept of which in itself indicates a being (in time)” (A143/B182). This 
is the first surprising statement: we have a pure concept of the understanding of that which 
corresponds to sensation, that is, the matter of appearance. By saying that this concept 
indicates a being (in time), Kant is already proceeding to the schema of this pure concept, 
“which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general” (A142/B181). This time-
determination is, then, in the case of reality, the indication of a being in time. Accordingly, 
negation indicates a non-being in time. So far, it seems that what we have is not an a priori 
discursive determination per se of the matter of appearance, but only an indication of its 
presence or absence.99 However, we might consider it the second surprising statement when 
Kant proceeds to argue that “every sensation has a degree or magnitude, through which it can 
more or less fill the same time, i.e., the inner sense in regard to the same representation of an 
object” (A143/B182). And it turns out that it is this specification which defines the schema 
of the pure concept of reality: “The schema of a reality, as the quantity of something insofar 
as it fills time, is just this continuous and uniform generation of that quantity in time, as one 
descends in time from the sensation that has a certain degree to its disappearance or 
gradually ascends from negation to its magnitude” (A143/B183). So rather than just a 
conceptual indication of the matter of appearance, Kant claims that we can actually have a 
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synthetic a priori knowledge of this matter: by knowing that it has a quantity, i.e., a 
degree.100  
Kant’s proof of the principle of the Anticipations of Perception goes as follows: 
Now from the empirical consciousness to the pure consciousness a gradual alteration is possible, where 
the real in the former entirely disappears, and a merely formal (a priori) consciousness of the manifold 
in space and time remains; thus there is also possible a synthesis of the generation of the magnitude of 
a sensation from its beginning, the pure intuition = 0, to any arbitrary magnitude (B208).  
There are several difficult questions that need to be asked concerning the current passage. 
First of all: What is the relation between the consciousness Kant talks about in the proof, the 
sensation, which is what Kant concludes can be generated, and the object of the sensation, 
which is what Kant’s claim in the headline of the Anticipations concerns? If it is granted that 
a sensation can be subject to a gradual alteration, does this necessarily imply that the real in 
the object, corresponding to that sensation, is also thus alterable?101 A related problem 
concerns the use of the concept of “alteration” Kant makes in the quoted passage. How are 
we to square Kant’s reference to a “gradual alteration” with his statement a few pages later, 
where he says that “the causality of an alteration in general (…) lie[s] entirely beyond the 
boundaries of a transcendental philosophy” (B213)? A clarification of this view can be found 
a few pages earlier: “If one regards this reality as cause (whether of the sensation or of 
another reality in appearance, e.g., an alteration), then one calls the degree of reality as cause 
a “moment,” (...) But I touch on this here only in passing, for at present I am not yet dealing 
with causality” (A168-169/B210). Here, alteration seems to rely on reality as cause, to which 
we would then be justified in applying the principle of the law of causality of the Second 
Analogy: “All alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and 
effect” (B232). It is clear from Kant's exposition, however, that he does not want to bring 
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alteration in the sense of causality into his discussion at this point. So the question remains: 
what kind of alteration is the “gradual alteration” of the Anticipations? 
Even disregarding these problems, it is not easy to see how the quoted passage is supposed to 
constitute a proof for the intensive magnitude of the matter of appearance. Is this claim really 
buttressed by postulating that a gradual alteration from empirical consciousness to pure 
consciousness is possible? We have to reject an “intuitive” interpretation of the passage in 
question: It is sometimes suggested that we can imagine going from complete silence, for 
instance, gradually up to any specific level of sound, or in the opposite direction, going down 
from the heard level of sound towards complete silence.102 Such empirical examples, 
however, can be met with equally empirical counterexamples. One case in point is heat. How 
are we to imagine this process when it comes to heat? As a gradual diminishment of heat, 
approaching absolute zero? Thought as a felt sensation, this would soon enough tip over to 
the increase of cold, rather than a gradual alteration towards less and less heat. 
If such a psychological reading of the proof is unavailable, it seems, however, no easier to 
find a proper transcendental interpretation. Could this kind of “gradual alteration” be seen as 
a condition of possible experience? It is difficult to envisage how, and the problem of 
intensive magnitude seems to provide one of the clearest cases of the problematic 
“formalism” which, as we noted in the introduction, Pippin finds in Kant: Because of his 
“dualism” of form and matter Kant struggles to account for their interrelation, and where he 
attempts to do so, like in the Anticipations, which promise to give us an a priori principle 
concerning what is strictly speaking empirical, his attempts are far from convincing.   
Longuenesse proposes that we can at least represent sensation, and the real which 
corresponds to it, as being a continuous magnitude. Her reason for suggesting this is as 
follows:  
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Although no sensation is successively synthesized, every sensation can at least be reflected, as the 
quale that it is, under the concept of a unit, by comparison with which its absence is nothing: zero. 
Both this reality = one, and this negation = zero, are posited in time. But between zero and one, and 
between one and zero, an infinite number of intermediate quantitative determinations can be posited.103 
As far as I can tell, however, one could still ask why we are entitled to conceive of a 
sensation as reflected under the concept of unit, in the quantitative sense connected to the 
principle of extensive magnitude, in the first place? And in any case, the problem remains 
that even if we can represent sensations, and the real, as continuous magnitudes, it still does 
not follow that they are continuous magnitudes. Anneliese Maier proposes that Kant actually 
considered the ground of the proof of the Anticipations to be a third form of intuition, in 
addition to space and time. Similarly, some have suggested that this third form must be 
“another time,” the outlines of which can be found in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
and that can ground the principle of intensive magnitude. 104 As intriguing as such a theory 
might be, I cannot see it as anything but a last resort, since Kant never explicitly mentions 
any forms of intuition other than that of inner sense and outer sense, i.e., time and space. 
Another possible path – enjoining the categories of quality with those of relation105 – is 
closed to us, on the basis of the arguments presented in 3.2. But I believe that the 
interpretation presented so far enables us to conceive of a new solution to this vexed 
problem. And it is to this possible solution I will now turn. 
We will have to approach the problem of the continuity of intensive magnitudes in steps. To 
introduce the necessary caveat, the interpretation given here accounts for three different 
kinds of intensive magnitude: 1) aesthetic clarity, 2) logical clarity, and 3) sensations that 
relate to objects, and the realities corresponding to them. I thus leave out the “relation to the 
feeling of pleasure and displeasure, by means of which nothing at all in the object is 
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designated, but in which the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation.”106 I 
will begin by first accounting for the intensive magnitude of consciousness, i.e., aesthetic 
clarity and logical clarity. These magnitudes can, I will argue, be shown to be continuous. 
But the crucial part of my argument is the following: I believe that it is only by reflecting on 
what the magnitude of consciousness can and cannot provide on its own that we can 
understand how to give an argument for the continuity of our point 3) above, that is, 
sensations that relate to objects, and the realities corresponding to them. But first, I will in 
the following paragraph begin by displaying the central role that consciousness has in the 
proofs of the Anticipations. 
Because of our previous analysis, we are well positioned to explain what other commentators 
have mainly passed over in silence; namely, the many references to consciousness in the text 
of the Anticipations.107 As we have seen, the proof at B208 refers to “empirical 
consciousness,” “pure consciousness,” and “formal (a priori) consciousness.” And towards 
the end of the Anticipations, Kant returns to offer another attempt at an explanation of how 
the proof works, because, as he says,  
some reservation is aroused about the fact that the understanding can anticipate a synthetic proposition 
of the sort which that concerning the degree of everything real in appearance is (…) and it is therefore 
a question not unworthy of solution, how the understanding can assert something synthetic a priori 
about appearances, and indeed anticipate them in that which is really merely empirical, namely what 
pertains to sensation (A175/B217). 
From this passage we can surmise that Kant is not unaware of the issue we pointed to above, 
namely, the apparent contradiction involved with having an a priori principle for what is, 
according to his own theory, strictly a posteriori. His attempt to explain should therefore be 
of great interest. He proceeds to, first of all, make it clear that the quality of sensation is 
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strictly empirical and cannot be anticipated. Afterwards comes what we must take to be his 
argument: 
But the real, which corresponds to sensations in general, in opposition to negation = 0, only represents 
something whose concept in itself contains a being, and does not signify anything except the synthesis 
in an empirical consciousness in general. In inner sense, namely, the empirical consciousness can be 
raised from 0 up to any greater degree, so that the very same extensive magnitude of intuition (e.g. an 
illuminated surface) can excite as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other (less illuminated) 
surfaces taken together (A175-176/B217, emphasis mine). 
Rather than focusing on the photometrical example Kant provides, I believe that the real clue 
lies in the emphasized sentence, namely, in the “synthesis in an empirical consciousness in 
general.” What kind of synthesis is this? My suggestion is that it inevitably involves the 
transcendental motion that we discussed in the previous chapter. This would explain the 
puzzling reference to “gradual alteration” (B208) that we noted earlier; the alteration in 
question is the “motion, as action of the subject” (B155n.). This interpretation also gives us 
at least an initial grasp on how the real that corresponds to sensations signify this synthesis of 
empirical consciousness. For as we have seen, it is this synthesis, transcendental motion, that 
determines inner sense to the degree of clarity with which any of our representations must be 
accompanied. In other words, the intensive magnitude of consciousness, at least, certainly 
signifies the “synthesis in an empirical consciousness.”108 In light of this, I must interpret 
Kant’s reference to “pure consciousness” and “a merely formal (a priori) consciousness” 
(B208) somewhat differently from what is normally assumed. This pure consciousness 
cannot be a consciousness of purely mathematical structures of time and space a priori, since 
these would undoubtedly be accompanied by a degree of clarity. While this might at first 
seem to be a problem, I believe that it actually fits with what Kant is saying about the pure 
consciousness in the Anticipations. For the full sentence about formal consciousness goes as 
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follows: “Now from the empirical consciousness to the pure consciousness a gradual 
alteration is possible, where the real in the former entirely disappears, and a merely formal (a 
priori) consciousness of the manifold in space and time remains” (B208). Admittedly, Kant 
is rather obscure here. But by equating the pure consciousness with the “consciousness of the 
manifold in space and time,” it can be argued that Kant is not equating it with a 
consciousness of any combination of this manifold, i.e., no synthesis.109 We should not, after 
all, forget that Kant considered sensation to be a presupposition for the “I think,” as the 
B422-423 footnote shows. Without re-entering the discussion of apperception, I can at least 
say that this would be my reading of “pure consciousness”: Not pure synthetic 
(mathematical) consciousness of spatiotemporal structures, but rather a pure consciousness 
of the manifold we are affected with, prior to any spontaneity and therefore prior to any 
synthesis. Not pure thought, but pure sense.  
If I am correct, and the “synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general” (A176/B217) 
can be understood in terms of the intensive magnitude of consciousness, we can begin by 
accounting for the continuity of this particular intensive magnitude. First, let us consider 
aesthetic clarity, i.e., the degree of clarity of spatiotemporal representations. It is in fact not 
too difficult to realize that this magnitude must be continuous. Since space and time, as the 
form of these intuitions, are continuous, the aesthetic clarity of our representations will be 
able to be continuously diminished or augmented. The conscious differences I am able to 
perceive between my spatiotemporal representations will always lie on a continuum of ever 
more precise or ever less precise distinctions between the spatiotemporal regions involved. 
So in this case, at least, the intensive magnitude is continuous for the same reason that 
extensive magnitudes are continuous; because of the continuity of space and time.  
As for logical clarity, that is, the degree of clarity of our conceptual representations, they 
must also be represented as continuous. Here we draw on Kant’s discussion in the Appendix 
to the Transcendental Dialectic, where he specifies the positive use of reason within 
theoretical philosophy. He there presents three subjectively necessary regulative principles: 
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Reason thus prepares the field for the understanding: 1. by a principle of sameness of kind in the 
manifold under higher genera, 2. by a principle of variety of what is same in kind under lower species; 
and in order to complete the systematic unity it adds 3. still another law of the affinity of all concepts, 
which offers a continuous transition from every species to every other through a graduated increase of 
varieties. We can call these principles of the homogeneity, specification and continuity of forms 
(A657-658/B685-686). 
Together, these three principles forms a “systematic unity” (A658/B686). Fortunately, it is 
not necessary for our present purposes to enter into the much-debated status of these 
principles. For what we are after is the status of our conceptual representations, rather than 
the objects these representations subsume, and when it comes to these representations the 
adduced principles of reason are undoubtedly valid (this is what constitutes their subjective 
necessity).110 In other words, the principle of continuity of forms guarantees the continuity of 
the logical clarity of representations.111 
We have taken the first step towards explicating the ground for the principle of intensive 
magnitude. But we must now face the real problem, namely, the question of sensation in 
general. The degree of clarity of representations seem to be a very special kind of sensation, 
and one may wonder if anything like the strategy adopted here for accounting for the 
continuity of this sensation can be given for sensations in general. The degree of clarity of 
your representations is one thing, but how do you show that the sensation of, e.g., warmth, is 
a continuous magnitude? To investigate this problem we must first look more closely into 
what a sensation is. 
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5.2 Causality and Sensation 
In the Anticipations, Kant says the following about sensation: “Since sensation in itself is not 
an objective representation, and in it neither the intuition of space nor that of time is to be 
encountered, it has, to be sure, no extensive magnitude, but yet it still has a magnitude” 
(B208). Earlier he describes it as “sensation, as merely subjective representation, by which 
one can only be conscious that the subject is affected, and which one relates to an object in 
general” (B207). What seems clear is that sensations are subjective representations, in which 
one is conscious that the subject is affected. As a side note, we see that the interpretation of 
inner sense I have given here is at an advantage in explaining why we call the determination 
of inner sense self-affection. If sensation is a representation “by which one can only be 
conscious that the subject is affected” (B207), then it seems that affection should involve 
sensation. Insofar as my account explicitly connects the self-affection of inner sense to a 
special kind of sensation, namely the degree of clarity of the representations, calling it self-
affection seems perfectly appropriate.112 Kant’s first mention of sensation, in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, seems to accord with what we have already said: “The effect of an 
object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation” (A19-
20/B34). However, here Kant is talking about the effect of an object on us, i.e., Kant’s 
phrasing seems to imply that the sensation is the effect of an object, considered as cause. 
Insofar as thinking of the object as cause might be problematic when we are considering 
self-affection (where the object is the soul), we have to investigate just what relation 
causality has to sensation. 
Fortunately, this problem overlaps with the problem we have already faced, namely: We can 
provide a justification (as I did in the previous chapter) for why the inner sensation of the 
degree of clarity is a continuous magnitude. But how is it possible to provide a similar 
justification for those sensations that are the direct effects of outer objects? It seems, thus, 
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that it is the sensations involved directly in causality for which an account of their continuity 
is still lacking.  
But first of all, we have to complicate our notion of sensation, since it must be admitted that 
what we have distinguished as inner sensation (the intensive magnitude of consciousness) 
and outer sensations (the effects of outer objects, i.e., sensations of color, warmth, sound, 
etc.) in fact cannot be completely separated. Phenomenologically speaking, we know that 
there is some relation between the intensive magnitude of consciousness and the perceived 
intensive magnitude of other sensations. The most obvious example is being unconscious: 
we presume that losing consciousness means losing (or at least strongly diminishing the 
intensive magnitude of) our outer sensations. It is moreover quite plausible to say that by acts 
of attention, we can augment or diminish the intensive magnitude of sensations (by changing 
focus, for instance). Kant, however, seems to go further: “A representation that is clear on 
the whole but not in respect of the parts is an indistinct representation. E.g. Blue and yellow 
make green, but with the green color we are not always conscious of these parts that lie 
within it[;] so too with concepts.”113 As we can see, the green color is here thought as a 
sensation as opposed to as a concept, and we must therefore conclude that Kant considers the 
sensation of green, insofar as one is not conscious of the blue and yellow that make it, to be 
an indistinct sensation.  
And this is not a pre-critical idea, but one that recurs in the critical writings: In the Critique 
of the Power of Judgment, Kant in two places (§14 and §51) discusses the theory of Euler: 
“That the colors are vibrations (pulsus) of the air immediately following one another,  just as 
tones are vibrations of the air disturbed by sound.”114 Kant’s question is whether some 
humans, at least, can be aware of this as a factor in their aesthetic judgment. After adducing 
evidence that this might be so, Kant says that if one takes this into account, “then one may 
see oneself as compelled to regard the sensations of both not as mere sensory impressions, 
but as the effect of a judging of the form in the play of many sensations.”115 In other words, 
the sensations (of colors and sounds) themselves must be seen as the effect of many 
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sensations. In fact, the picture Kant gives us of sensations is quite complex. For he also 
seems to assert that sensations can be “mere sensory impressions,” by which, in the case of 
colors and sounds at least, he seems to mean “the effect of these vibrations on the elastic 
parts of our body.”116 The implication of this is that not only the intensity but also the quality 
of sensations are affected by the intensive magnitude of our consciousness, e.g., the quality 
“color” is a result of our inability to distinctly perceive the vibrations of the air. In any case, 
it is obvious that Kant does not see sensations as simple qualia in the sense that modern 
philosophy might be inclined to do. The degree of clarity of our representations is the reason 
we see a simple green qualia instead of its blue and yellow parts, and the reason we see light 
as a simple sensory impression instead of the “play of many sensations,” as vibrations of the 
air. It should already be clear from our discussion of the intensive magnitude of 
consciousness that sensations are not in every sense, at least, without parts. But in the 
sensations we have considered here, it is not really clear whether they have parts, and if so, in 
what sense.  
What this also means, however, is that we must refine the question we posed above. As we 
remember, our previous question was: What could possibly justify claiming that sensations 
resulting from being affected by objects (i.e., those that are not a degree of clarity of 
representations) are continuous magnitudes? But as we have now seen, a sensation might be 
caused by an outer object, but the sensation itself nevertheless has a degree of clarity (i.e., the 
sensation of green is an indistinct sensation of green and blue, and in the last instance 
perhaps the obscure representation of a play of many sensations, caused by vibrations in the 
air), and this necessitates a preliminary question: how can we first separate out that in the 
sensation which corresponds to an objective reality, to a feature of the object, rather than 
being a subjective “perspectival effect” caused by the degree of clarity of the 
representation?117 The real question, then, is this: how is it possible to objectively determine 
an intensive magnitude? And to this question, Kant, at least in his Reflexions, has a clear 
answer. He says that “one cannot say that warmth consists of warmnesses, one thus does not 
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determine its magnitude in accordance with the parts that it contains, but rather in accordance 
with the effects that it produces, e.g., that it causes a body to expand.”118 
Here we find our discussion returning back to causality: A sensation can be determined to 
correspond to a feature of the object if the sensation is found to be an effect of this object 
upon our sensory organs. What I will propose is the following: In general, for the reality 
corresponding to sensation to be an objective feature it must be causal power. 119 Moreover, 
the objective reality of the intensive magnitude is determined by the results of this causality, 
i.e., by the “effects that it produces.” Intensive magnitudes, when they are causal powers, can 
be determined because they can then produce determinate effects, which is to say, they can 
produce determinate changes in extensive magnitudes. In Kant’s example, the intensive 
magnitude of warmth can be determined in accordance with the expansion it causes in a body 
of mercury, i.e., by means of a thermometer. As Warren points out: “According to Kant, the 
part-whole structure characteristic of quantity is not to be found in an intensive magnitude, 
but rather in its consequences.”120 Thus, in the Metaphysik Volckmann, Kant explains that: 
“The illuminating power of a wax light is intensively greater than that of a tallow light, for, 
with the first we would be able to read at a distance of 2 feet, but with the latter only at a 
distance of 1 foot.”121 My own interpretation adds two crucial points to this: first, that this 
only holds for the intensive magnitudes of objects; second, that this fact, in conjunction with 
the proof of the continuity of the intensive magnitude of consciousness, is what grounds 
Kant’s principle of intensive magnitude.122 
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Through determination of causal power, we are also able to determine realities that only 
indirectly “correspond” to our sensations; for instance, magnetic matter: “Thus we cognize 
the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from the perception of attracted iron 
filings, although an immediate perception of this matter is impossible for us given the 
constitution of our organs” (A226/B273). In other words, the magnetic matter has no 
perceivable causal effect upon our sensory organs (Kant refers to the “crudeness” of our 
senses), but we determine its reality through the causal effects that it has on other bodies 
(iron).  
An advantage of this interpretation is that it also provides a plausible account of one of the 
most problematic criteria for a theory of inner sense: the asymmetry of the 
immediacy/mediacy of time. As we remember, neither Allison nor Valaris gave a fully 
convincing account of this asymmetry. However, if we determine the objective features 
corresponding to our sensations by means of determining causal relations, thereby 
determining the intensive magnitudes as causal powers, this should also explain why time is 
the immediate condition of our inner intuitions, and the mediate condition of outer 
appearances. Our inner intuitions are immediately encountered in relations of succession. 
Now causality, and the categories of relation generally, are schematized as “rule[s] of time-
determination” for “the relation of perceptions among themselves to all time” (A145/B184). 
But the categories of relation are also said to deal with the “existence of appearances” 
(A178/B221). And this dual significance of the principles given in the Analogies of 
Experience – they give rules for the connection of perceptions; and they concern the 
existence of appearances – is the key to understanding why outer appearances are mediately 
temporal.  
                                                                                                                                           
Routledge, 1969), §481.) He goes on to give examples of this identity; one of them is the one we have considered here: 
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What happens is that the immediately temporal, successive, inner perceptions give rise to the 
cognition of objective causal powers by determining the existence of objects in time, objects 
having the objective realities to which the sensations correspond. Only by reference to outer 
objects persisting in time and having causal powers can we determine intensive magnitudes, 
and the immediately temporal and indeterminately intensive inner intuitions therefore give 
rise to mediately temporal and determinately intensive outer objects of experience.123 This is 
a crucial point: The temporality of our perceptions is immediate, as we have seen in section 
4.2 on transcendental motion. On the basis of (i.e., mediated through) these subjective 
perceptions, we are able to affirm the existence of appearances, as objects, by connecting the 
perceptions according to rules. And these rules are rules for determining objective time-
relations: “Our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is 
therefore always changing. We can therefore never determine from this alone whether this 
manifold, as object of experience, is simultaneous or successive” (A182/B225, emphasis 
mine).   
It is not so strange, therefore, that Kant distinguishes “mathematical” from “dynamical” 
principles: “In the application of the pure concepts of understanding to possible experience 
the use of their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamical: for it pertains partly merely 
to the intuition, partly to the existence of an appearance in general” (A160/B199). We can 
recognize the distinction between intuition and the existence of an appearance from the 
passage concerning time, where time is said to be: “the immediate condition of the inner 
intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances” 
(A34/B50-51, emphasis mine).  
This account might seem to invite the following conclusion: that what we experience are 
primarily inner perceptions, and only mediately outer, empirical objects. However, such a 
conclusion would be premature. For we must remember that there are two distinct cases of 
an asymmetry with regard to mediacy and immediacy: the asymmetry with regard to time 
should be kept separate from the asymmetry with regard to experience. In terms of the 
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asymmetries between inner and outer sense we listed in 2.1.1, we have now accounted for all 
but the last of them. That is to say, we have explained how the inner manifold is dependent 
upon the outer manifold, and how the outer temporality is dependent upon the inner 
temporality, but we have not yet said anything about how inner experience is dependent upon 
outer experience. To this final task we now turn. 
5.3 Inner Experience 
What, exactly, is inner experience? In his interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism, which 
bases its argument on such inner experience, Allison distinguishes between two possible 
readings of what inner experience involves: “One, which we shall term a “thick” conception 
of empirical self-knowledge, takes the premise to be that the self has some knowledge of its 
past mental states,”124 meaning that the self has knowledge of its own history, i.e., through 
veridical memory. He continues: 
The alternative reading of the premise in question opts for a relatively “thin” conception of empirical 
self-knowledge. Rather than assuming that a consciousness of one’s existence as determined in time 
includes a knowledge of one’s past and, therefore, involves a reliance on memory, it limits this 
knowledge to the contents of one’s current mental state.125 
The way Allison frames the alternatives, the choice is thus between a diachronic knowledge 
of one’s past, and a synchronic knowledge of one’s act of recollecting of the past (whether 
veridical or not). In any case, the knowledge involved is the knowledge of one’s mental 
states, either historically or just in the present.  
The definition of inner experience is important for the Refutation of Idealism because it 
needs to fulfil two criteria: on the one hand, it must be something that his Cartesian opponent 
accepts, so as not to beg the question. On the other hand, it must be something that will, 
together with the other premises, lead to the desired conclusion: that inner experience 
presupposes outer experience. The problem with the “thick” reading is that a Cartesian 
philosopher may not accept a premise based upon knowledge of one’s past mental history 
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(since the evil demon might have distorted all your memory, or simply created a totally false 
one). The “thin” reading fares much better; note that it still requires, however, a conscious 
memory of a past mental state (however false that memory might be). Allison exemplifies 
the virtue of the “thin” conception by imagining someone who has just been created by an 
evil demon, with false memories and beliefs about his past existence; in this case, the “thin” 
conception still works.126 In any case, the interpretation of inner sense that I have given in 
this thesis has also proposed a new interpretation of what an “inner state” is (the degree of 
clarity of representations), and thus might also give us a new conception of inner experience. 
My suggested reading for what “inner experience” in the argument of the Refutation of 
Idealism consists in is thus: being conscious of any determinate inner intuition. Now clearly 
this premise is something the Cartesian opponent would not object to; indeed, it seems to go 
straight to the first step taken after the “I am thinking” has been established: clear and 
distinct ideas. In other words: what is known when I am conscious of my own existence as 
determined in time is simply any synchronic consciousness of something determinate. 
Against this interpretation, on may ask: How can this be consistent with Kant’s insistence 
that I am “conscious of my existence as determined in time” (B275, emphasis mine)? Is this 
not clearly a reference to diachronicity? To this question I would answer that my argument 
assumes that Kant refers to a determinate filling of time, i.e., a determinate degree of a 
determinate reality at a moment in time. I take Kant’s point to be that a determinate filling of 
time, i.e., determinate mental content, requires and therefore presupposes a reference to the 
causal time-determination of things existing outside of and (empirically) independently of us, 
in space.127 In other words: If, for instance, the “I think,” and thus the indeterminate 
perception grounding it (B422-423n.), is to be determined, then this determination must 
happen in time. But this presupposes a determination in space. For the possibility of 
determining this indeterminate perception depends upon a causal time-determination, and 
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any such causal determination relies upon (as shown in the First Analogy) a reference to a 
permanent substance, and this permanency can only be found in space. This reading should 
allow us to counter Longuenesse’s problem concerning the Refutation. After presenting her 
reading of it, she asserts that: “the most his new Refutation of Idealism seems to be 
establishing is that in my consciousness there is a necessary distinction between objects of 
inner sense and objects of outer sense, and the latter are just as immediately present as the 
former, indeed are a condition for the determinate consciousness of the former.”128 In other 
words, whereas Kant arguably succeeds in arguing for “the existence of a thing outside me, 
and not just of my representation of the existence of a thing outside me,”129 Longuenesse 
argues that this is still valid only within consciousness. On the basis of the interpretation 
given in this thesis, however, we can see that this must be mistaken. For it is exactly by 
reference to what is distinct from consciousness, and its intensive magnitude, that it is 
possible to determine any intensive magnitude. That is, the entire procedure is aimed at 
distinguishing the “effect” consciousness and its degree of clarity has on sensation from the 
effects of the objective realities that correspond to its sensations.  
Still, the question might be asked: if this is the case, then does it even make sense to talk 
about inner experience? If experience is only possible as experience of causal powers and 
causal relations, how can we conclude that inner experience presupposes outer experience? 
Should we not rather say that outer experience is the only experience possible for us? If inner 
experience is possible for Kant, as far as I can see, then it has to be indirect and mediated 
through outer experience in a strong sense. For the intensive magnitude of consciousness can 
only be determined indirectly by measuring it against already determined outer experience. 
For example, the fact that we experience the world in colors tells us something about 
ourselves – on the condition that we know the causal processes involved, and are therefore 
able to see indirectly how our mental powers contribute to the representation that we 
perceive. Similarly, by knowing that the causal impressions remain fairly constant we can get 
an idea of how much an act of attention contributes to the degree of clarity of a specific 
representation, and thus obtain some information concerning the intensive magnitude of our 
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mental powers. In other words, it is only by first knowing something about what the world is 
like that we have any chance of determining our particular point of view with regard to it. 
Knowledge of your own body is of course essential to such an experiential process, because 
we need to know the capabilities of our sensory organs in order to understand the 
contribution our own mental powers make to the state of our representations. 
I do not intend to say that the question of the temporal order of our mental states is irrelevant 
to an interpretation of Kant on inner experience. But I do believe that this issue must at least 
be considered concomitant with the question of determining our mental content in the first 
place, which is what I have discussed here. It seems to me that this determining is the crucial 
factor with respect to inner experience and the Refutation of Idealism. 
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6. Conclusion 
The most fundamental move, the key idea, of the present thesis has been to connect the 
determination of inner sense with the degree of clarity of our representations. The bulk of the 
thesis has therefore been dedicated to displaying and arguing for its plausibility and 
explanatory power. To take stock of the interpretation, let us therefore list the main results 
that point in its favour, as they have been brought up in the course of the investigation:  
First of all, Kant refers to inner sense as the source of inspiration for the inner state of 
Leibniz’ monads. The inner state of the monads is most felicitously described as a point of 
view, constituted by the distribution of clarity and distinctness over their representations. 
This suggests that the same should be the case for inner sense. And in fact, we already found 
that a unified interpretation of inner sense could promisingly begin from the idea of a point 
of view, though this point of view should not be a spatial location. The distribution of clarity 
and distinctness over our representations fulfil these requirements: it constitutes a non-spatial 
point of view.  
As section 3.1 has shown, Kant has a theory of the clarity and distinctness of representations. 
Despite first appearances, one cannot doubt that they are included within his critical 
framework, and constitute an important background for his philosophy. This is of course a 
prerequisite for my interpretation of inner sense. But given this, it also seems legitimate to 
ask: How would we be given these qualitative features of our representations if not through 
our inner sense?   
In 3.2, I suggested that my reading is supported by the footnote where Kant explicitly 
connects the intensive magnitude of consciousness with the clarity of representations. Since 
the intensive magnitude of consciousness seems to qualify as an “intuition of our self and our 
inner state” (A33/B49), it must be given through inner sense. This implies that the intensive 
magnitude of consciousness is what corresponds to the sensation of a degree of clarity.  
Furthermore, Kant points to “attention” as an example of self-affection, which implies that 
an act of attention determines inner sense. It is plausible, both from an intuitive and from an 
exegetical point of view, to conceive of attention as a modification of the degree of clarity of 
representations.  
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More generally, I have attempted to use these results in outlining a unified interpretation of 
inner sense. The grounding idea is that inner sense is a condition of experience, because 
experience requires the action of describing what affects us from outside. It is necessary to 
perceive distinctions – without the ability to perceive distinctions one can hardly even be 
said to be alive. This basic ability to describe by making distinctions in what we are given 
was identified as transcendental motion. On this basis our inner point of view on the world is 
constituted: As the distribution of degrees of clarity of our representations, the 
differentiations we are able to perceive in the world. But experience as we know it is only 
possible through judgment, and this judgment must involve a reference to objective states, 
states of objects existing in space. The analysis of causality and experience given in the final 
sections of the thesis aimed to sketch how this can be conceived. The immediately temporal 
sensible discriminations determined through transcendental motion are not yet determined by 
concepts: they do not figure as a part of our knowledge. The determination by means of 
concepts aims to extract the objective feature of our immediate perceptions through causal 
judgments. And it is only on the basis of such an extraction that one can estimate the 
subjective contribution, and thereby attain inner experience.  
As I mentioned in the introduction, the thesis is not a complete explication of the role of 
inner sense in Kant’s philosophy, or in the Critique for that matter. My aim was to present a 
framework which could make this explication possible: Toward this aim, I have attempted to 
show, or at least indicate, how my interpretation can account for all six criteria listed in 
2.1.2. Yet it is quite obvious that there is more to be said concerning each of them. To return 
to the very beginning of the thesis, it must be admitted that we have not yet passed beyond 
the state of affairs recounted by Van Cleve and Allison: the full nature of Kant’s theories of 
time and self-knowledge remains obscure. Nevertheless, I hope to have helped bring some of 
the resources inherent in Kant’s system out of obscurity and into the open. If the suggested 
framework is not completely off the mark, then further investigation should prove fruitful.  
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